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PREFACE

China's militant approach to the economic and political fields
has dra\m the attention of the Western and the Chinese Scholars, and
much has been written about it in the past few years.

In the present

study , I have endeavored to analyse the salient features of Chinese
approach to economic development. I have dwelt upon at length
the peculiar method used by the Communist countries - of cutting
down the consumption and raising investment. In the absence of official
statistics since 1959 , the study of the Chinese economic development
has been reduced to "educated guesses," where I have relied heavily
on the Western Scholars for the information used.
To Dr. Leonard J. Arrington, Professor of Economics, the
author expresse s his appreciation and gratitude for his invaluable
assistance and continuous guidance in preparation of this thesis.
The writer is also indebted to Professors V. L. Isrealson, B. C.
Jensen, E. B. Mnrray and R. P . Collier for their precious guidance
and encouragement.

To Mrs. Alide Hannwm and Dr . Thomas Hannwm,

I am thankful for reading the manuscript and making valuable suggestions.
Many thanks to my mother , whose inspiration and encouragement
has enabled me to go

fo~

higheJ" studies in the United States.

Appreciation is also due to Mrs. Charell Harris , who has patiently
typed this manuscri pt.

Mandhatasinh A. Chauhan

CHAPTER I

AGRICULTURE JN THE CHINESE ECONOMY

Introducti on

Chinese agriculture differs from the Western agriculture in
the deve lopment and utilization of agricultural science on the fields .
China has always been an agricultural country, but she failed to improve t n techniques of cultivation as the time passed by .

The land,

prior to the Communist take -over, was owned and cultivated by individuals and the produ ce was so ld in a free-market.

Unfortunately,

the Chinese governme nt, prior to 1949, failed to bring about adequate
agricultura l r e forms and implement eco nomic development measures.
As a result an overwi1e lming propor tion of tpe,popi.tlation of China
is occupied on the land , the supply of which is fixed, and the capital
r e s ources e mployed are s ma ll , the per capita output and income of
China a re low . With the vas t majority of the population in agriculture
and low per capita output , the national income of the country is also
low.

Thus , China is classified as an underdeveloped nation . Arising

fro m the same problem of overpopulation , the family land was subd ivided a nd fr agmented into e conomi callv ine fficient units before the
Communist take-over.

2

With its low per capita income, China's capital formation is
slow and difficult . Investme nt in substantial quantities is al most impossible , unless the country imports foreign assistance or cuts down its
own consumption be low even the present low level and forcibly creates
an exportable surplus.

For an agricultural nation to transform itself

i nto an industrial one , creation of an agricultural s urplus is desirable,
not only to finance imports of industrial goods, but also to feed the
growing urban non-agricultural population. An agricultural surplus
also will satisfy the demand resulting from the rise in per capita i ncome. An agricultural surplus is a prerequisite toward establishing
social overhead capital , expanding manufacturi ng, providing educational
facilities and other services, and raising the rural per capita income .
This, relatively a general statement, is applicable to a country
that has a comparative advantage in agriculture.
The Chinese Communists, after 1949, sought to riase the per
capita income and productivity of their resources by "raising the ir own
bootstraps. " If the efficient farmers had been allowed to expand their
activities, they could have raised the productivity.

But the Communist

regime, in accordance with Socialist dogma , chose to organize farms
mto cu- o""rad.<Oii.
izJ.tion .

Therein lay tt.t I

"proble m of China's indus trial-

3

Cultivabl e Lands

Of China's to ta l area of 9 . 5 million square milometers, l. 09
million is far m l and , 967,000 is forest , 2. 67 million is pasture , a nd
l. 13 m;d u)H r ec laimable waste land .

About 6 percent of the cultivated

land (600 , 000 squar e kil om eters) mainly in the north·, is alkali soil. 1
Thu s , the present cultivable area could be doubled within a short period with little e fforts.
China is said to have today 1 , 600 million mow (9, 714 million
acres) of arab le land , or 0. 4 1175 acres per head , as compared to
0 . 32 94 acres i n Britain, 0. 57645 acr es in Holland, 0. 658 8 in India ,
1. 81 17 acres in t he United States a nd France, and 2 . 4705 in So11iet
R ussia.

2
It has been reported that only a bout 80 million he ctares (or ,

197. 6 80 million acres) are s uitabl e for tractors .

The "machine

1
Ha rold Mun te-Ka.1.s, "China's F 1e lds and Factories ," Far
Easte rn Economic R eview, LI (Februa ry 3, 1966) , 153.
2 P . H. M. Jones, "One Million Tractors," Far Eastern Economic
Review , XLVI (September 3 , 1964) . 431.
Converted into a cres; one m o w = 0. 1647 acres , or 0 . 0666 hectare.
n.buut t:. . 5 ll1V\" iu China fJ Ll .. t..." ...1 ~~ c-:>mpared to 2 mow in
Britain, 3. 5 in Holla nd , 4 i n Ind ia , 11 in the United States and
France. a nd 15 in !ioviet Ru ssia.

4

cult1vated area would probably not exceed onc-eightb or under one-tenth
of the total c ultivated land .
in

a~eas

Since land s ui table for tractors is located

of low y1elds . the margmal increase in the production, owing

to c ul i vati on by tractors would be minimal. ,.I Even if there is an increas

of 15 to 20 percent in th

10 percent of the land planted to grain,

the increa st' in rhe output would amount to l. 5 to 2 percent.

Agricultural Institutions

Communists dogmatically b .lieve in uprooting the older
institutions and imposing centrally-controlled orgamzations .
as soon as the

Thus,

hine se Communists came into power , they began a

reorganiMtJOn of agriculture .

T his policy also elicited the support

of peasants for the regime . In Russia , collectivization was adopted
by a "one step at a time " m ethod and mechani zation took place simultaneously . Aware of her industrial backwardness , China decided to
collectivi ze hurr1edly.

2

1
Yuan-Li Wu , ''Industrial Deve lopme nt in China ," Current
History , XXXXV (September , 1963) , 175 . Convered on the basis
of one hectare = 2. 471 acres .

2
s. B. Thomas . 'Commumst China' s AgTarian Policy , 19541956 , '' Pacific Affairs. XXTX (Jun , 1956) , 145 .

5

The ultimate goal was to organize the small individual farms
into large collective farms.

The temporary mutual aid groups , per-

manent mutual aid groups, and agricultural producers ' co-operatives
were finally to lead to the formation of collective farms.

Under the

mutual aid teams, members pooled some of their draft animals and
implements, co-ordinated some of their individual production plans,
and accumulated common property. 1
All the land was pooled in an agricultural co -operative.

Each

member retained the ownership and the share (according to the size
of his land) . on which he drew dividends.

2

He was allowed to keep a

plot of land for his personal use .
By September, 1954 , a total of 500 , 000 co-operative farms,

and by 195 7, half of the country's land and more than half of the
peasant households , were to be organized into co-operatives. 3

1
Yuan-Li Wu , An Economic Survey of Communist China
(New York: Bookman Associ ates, 1956), p. 143.
2
T. J. Hughes and D. E. T. Luarcl , The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949-1958 (New York: Oxford University
} ' ( L <·, 1959) , p . 143.
3Yuan-Li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China,
p . l H.

6

The c o-operatives were envis aged as a means of enabling largescale mechani zed farming and deve lopment of new techniques and innovations.

They were also designed to e nable planning of agriculture,

industry, coms umption and investme nt , exports, and so on.

Cooperatives

were thought to comply with the Communist philosophy of the ownership
of the means of production held by the state and the elimination of
private property.

The system permitted direct control by the party cadre,

as the heads of the co-operatives, over the peasants.
At the end of 1954 Peking realized that agricultural production

had not increased much from the 1952 level, while the population had
inc reased consistently by a 2 pe rce nt annua l average over the 19481953 period.

Thus , Mao called for an immediate collectivization and

production drive in mid-1955. 1
On March 25, 1955, the Agricultural Bank of China was established
under the over-all direction of the state-owned Chinese People's Bank.
Its m ain purpose was to exte nd short and long term credits to farmers .

1
Edwin F. Jones, "The Impact of the Food Crisis on Peiping's
P olicies, " Asian Survey , II (December, 1962), 3-4.

1956 1 II

2s. h . Thomas , " ommun' ·• , J" na ' Agrarian Policy , 1954p. 158.

2

7

The co-operatives were not large e nough to exercise effective
control over commercial credits and industrial establishments, which
had to be controlled by the central government directly.

Even shortage

of managerial skills was felt acute ly , for co-operatives could not obtain
enough personnel to establish large-scale industries. 1 The same was
true in obtaining industrial finances locally.

Thus, the co-operatives,

comprising around 200 families, were reorganized into communes of
4 , 000 to 5, 000 families in August, 1958.

Private plots were abolished

and so were the free markets in which the peasants could sell their
produce.
Paradoxically, Communist China fac ed a disastrous period of
natural calamities between 1959 a nd 1962, which made its leaders revise their policies.

They had to reintroduce the free-market, and pri-

vate plots were restored .

2

At the same time, the time required to work

on the communes was fixed to e nable farmers to work on their private

1
Dwight H. Perkins, "Centralization and Decentralization in
Mainland China's Agriculture, 1949-1962," The Quarterly Journal of
Economics , LXXVID (May, 1964) , p. 229.
2Audu oy Donuelll.orn, "The urg"a ·c.tion of Rural Trade in China
Since 1 58," The China ~uarterl y, VID (October -December, 1961),

rv n

n.

8
pl0!R. 1 The communes we r e organized into production brigade s , which
were furthe r divided int • p roduction te ams . The brigade decided upon
th

agricultu ral pr odu ctio n , while the tea m alloc ated the l abor and

spe ciali zed on d ifferent far~ ac tivities .

2

Thus, after seve ral years

of tri a l and error with the large units o f holdings, the Peking regime
came bac k to a unit smaller than that with which it had started.

Agriculture and Price Poli cy

In 1950 agricultura l production was pe rhaps two-thirds of the prewar leve l , and the amount that was marke te d had declined to 21 percent
of the total output , which wa s at 53 percent level of the total , in the prewar period . 3 This decline was the result of the thirteen years of war
followed by the Civil War , which had disrupte d the rural marke ts.
P rcd c tion of the industrial raw materials had declined sharply.
Output o f cotton had fa llen to 47 percent of tho 1933 production in 1949,

1 F elix Green, Awakened China (Ne w York: Doubleday, 1961) ,
p

4 '
2

.T,~ n ltohi ns on , " Th e Chi n•''"' C'o mmune s , " The P olitical
uar te r l , XXXV (July-Septe m ber, 1964) , pp. 2~8-89.

9

while that of tea and cocoa fe ll to 16 pe rcent and 4 percent of the 1933
level. 1
The Peking regime made a n e ffective use of
in increasing the output.

price~incentives

The official price was raised to the pre-war

level, whi ch was again raised in 1951, and paid in advance for the promise of planting cotton in a certain number of acres.

This resulted in

a reduction of grain acreage by 11 percent and diverting more land to
cotton and oilseed crops by 1959. 2
This raised the production of cotton beyond expectations and
the acreage under it above the 1933 leve l.
advance purchases were abolished.

So in 1953 the cotton

The price of cotton was lowered

compared to grains so as to encourage the pvoduction of grans.

But

this had an adverse effect, so advance purchases were reintroduced
to the 1952 level in 1954. 3

1 T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh , The E conomy of the Chinese Mainland: National In come and Economic Development, 1933-1959, (2 vols;
Santa Monica: Rand Research Memorandum, 1963), p. 45 5 .
2Reed J. Irvine, "Phantom Food in Communist China," Asian
;:)u ... ve >, ~ . ~ Nia .::t..t, ..i.~ J .i J , 1-' · 23 .

3Perkins, op. cit. , p . 213 .
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The parity ratio was employed in determining the rate at which
cotton farmers should pay the agricultural tax computed in terms of
grain and exchanging cotton for grain through the government-sponsored
marketing agencies.

The price of tea was raised from 4. 9 to 5. 7 times

the price of middle grade rice in 1951, and to 7. 86 times in 1953. 1 Tea
production increased gradually.
The state faced difficulties in making substantial grain purchases
during the 1950-1953 period, in spite of the substantial increase in grain
output.

This was because the llicome elasticity of food in underdeveloped

countries is higher, around 0. 6 or higher, versus 0. 2 or 0. 3 in the
developed countries . 2 Thus, with a slight rise in per capita income,
the demand for food grains has a much greater imact.

TI1is generally

could be suppressed by a high agricultural taxation policy or quota
system. Approximately 90 percent of China's taxes were collected in
agricultural products.

Nevertheless, it was likely to lead to an in-

flation in agricultural prices .

1
2

Ibid. , p. 214.

Bruce F. Johnston and John W. Mel'lor, ''Role of Agriculture
in Econo mic Development," American Economic Review, lJ (September,
1961), pp. 57'--572 .

11

For this reason , the Communist regime introduced the quota
system in 1954-1955.

This , of course, affected the farmer's incentives

to produce more , so agricultural production fell.
Under the quota system, the state purchased excessively, regardless of what consumption needs were.
tent among the farmers.

This sparked off a discon-

Thus, in 1956 quotas were reduced.

This

caused the government to feel the need for introducing centralized
organization to implement the wishes of the state in the field of agricultural production. Aware of the effect of the centralization on the
Soviet agriculture, the Chinese carefully left a gap to provide sufficient
incentives to the farmers .
During this period , although private plots were allotted to individuals , the free market was abolished and the prices of these subsidiary products were fixed arbitrarily low by the state and to cooperative stores.

The output on private plots, which amounted to 30

percent of all Chinese farm products, fell sharply in 1956. 1 In 1957
the regime increased the size of the private plots and reduced cadre
interference into the farm er's activities on the plot .

1
1~. L. Chao , Ecuno nu~ P ..w u ..... -b _ ! . ~ Orga.cization in Mainla nd China , (2 vols., Cambridge, Ma ssachutte s: Centre for East Asian
StudJ <: S, Harva rd Unive r sn;y . 1959\, TI . ·1:1 - 17.

12

In 1956 and 1957 officials again tried to raise the production of
crops through raising purchase prices.

The prices of grapeseeds

were raised from 50 percent to 70 percent in 1956; that of oil seeds
from 10 percent to 30 percent.

The price of tea, which was already 7

perc ent up from the 1955 leve l , was further raised by 7 percent.
Control over the rate of savings was achieved by merely setting
limitations on the proportion of income that dould be saved.
This centralization acted as a repulsive force on agricultural
yields, which increased at a very slow rate between 1956 and 1957. 1
Industrial growth in 195 7 was th(ts slowed down,, 0\ving to the
Jack of co-ordination and planning in different sectors of the economy.
Absence of sufficient incentives, the overemphasis given to industrial
priority, and the cash crops in agriculture were causes.

Thus, by

1958 the economy was at its low ebb, even worse than what it was in
1955 .
In order to expand the unit of agricultural production, the communes
were organized in 1958.

The cadre influence on subsidiary production,

on the rate of savings and consumption, and on the planting and harvesting

1
p . lJ '1,

Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960),

13

of the major crops was enormous under the mass propaganda of the
"Great Leap Forward. nl Private plots and free markets were abolished
altogether.

The establishment of communes ended all house ownership

and nationalized all shops. 2
According to the official series of the gross value of agricultural
output, Peking claimed to have an annual rate of increase of 4. 5 percent
during the First Five Year Plan .

This claim is dubious. In 1958 and

early 1959 grain production was declared to be 375 million metric tons,
as compared with 185 million tons in 1957. 3 This doubling of grain output within a year is clearly impossible and serves to reveal the faulty
statistical system that China was using.
The decentralization of authority to the communes level in 19581959 led to undue competition among the communes which resulted

1

Peking, op. cit. , p. 228.

2R. H. S. Crossman, "Chinese Notebook," Encounter, (March,
1959) , p. 19; and "Transition to Communism (II)," China News Analysis,
No. 279 (June 5, 1959) , l-7.

3Yuan-Li Wu, The Economy of Communist China: An Intoduction,
q
(N w York : Frederick A. Praeger Publish ing Company, 1965) , p. 136.
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in tiJ.e falsification of statistics. 1 This furth er disrupted planned goals
and co-ordination with other sectors of the econo my. 2
At che s ame t:me huge credits and budget allocations were made
to the co m , une s by the state for the first time under the "Great Leap"

feve r. ~ Tni~ ied them to ignore income, profit , and efficiency goals;
they concentrated on fulfilling the targets only .
Under the communes, the food which was earlier grown on pri vate plots served as free supply, under the "part-wage part-free supply"
system of distribution. 4
Ag:tin in 1959 the official productivity claim abruptly declined
to 250 mil lion tons; that is, one-third smaller than the original
esti mate, which is a lso undoubtedly an over-statement . 5 The unavailability of accurate statistics and the decentralized control made it
difficult for the regime to react immediately to the crisis presented by
the bad weathe r in 1959 and 1961.

,

- choh Ming - Li. The Statistical System of Communist China
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1962) , p. 71.
2A. Donnethorn, "Background to ·.the People's Communes: Changes
in China ' s Economic Organization in 1958," Pacific Affairs , XXXII
(December, 1959), 353.
3 ·· col:.dnc uis, - Ch~11a

4

.1

e \-~ _'..;:.. 1,-_:~

No. 258 ("'T 3nuary 2. 1958) , 5 .

Donnet"-orn , cp. ci':. , p. 349; ard 'f'nrki ns, op. c it. , p. 231.

vThe "'!all

S_t:ree_t_o!ou!'!'~ ,

August 27, 1959 ; and Irvine, op. cit., p. 23.
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In 959 the regime reintroduced private plots and free markets. 1
A family of six could have one -tenth or even one -fifth of an acre as its
private plot; in any case, the area set aside for them in a commune should
not exceed 5 or 7 percent of the total. 2

Agricultural Prociluction

It is difficult to obtain accurate data regarding agricultural

production according to crops.

Whatever data are available are highly

conflicting and at times misleading.

The figures presented here are

estimates.
On observing Table 1, one can see a sharp decline in total grain
acreage and production in 1959.

The mistake in shifting acreage to

cotton and oil seed production was corrected in 1960, but total grain productlon did not improve fast enough because of mismanageme nt and bad
weather.
On the whole , agricultural production has barely kept pace with
the p

· at"!D incre a os, except for the bad weather years of 1959-1962

when China faced a s evere agricultural crisis.

1DonP.elhQr'1e , "'The Or gani ?:· t.\0 n f Rura l Trade in China Since
1958." The China Quarterly, No . 8 (vetobt.1-De e mbe r, 1<iol j , 77- 91;
Qnct "Cl a nges and Mudd le." China New>< -~~~- No. 299 (October 30,
9(>9) !.

Tab' e

I

' ' 1 '-lP

-

;>. >duc tion in mainland China - 1955-1963

---

Total gr ain
P r octuC:O;:;(m . m< tric
Are a
(m . hect3re s )
to ns _,

Rice

-- - ·-·

Yea·

Potatoes_ _

Wheat

Ar ea

Prodution

Area

Prodution

Are a

- -- -

P1·odu--:.on

Misce llaneou '!___

Ar e a

P r odution

-- - - - -

19 5

11 8 . "

174 . 8

29 . 2

78 . 0

26 . 7

23. 0

10.1

18.9

52. 4

55. 0

195 '

12-L 3

182 . 5

33.2

82 . 5

27.3

24.8

11. 0

21.9

52.7

53. 4

195

120 . 9

185 . 0

32 .2

86 .8

27 . 5

23.7

10. 5

21. 9

50.6

52.7

195<1

12 l. 3

250.0
193 . 5*

32.7

113.7
90. 0*

26.6

29.0
24 . 0*

16.3

45.4
29.3*

45.7

62. 0
50.2 *

19 59

1>·:J . J

270. 1
167 .6*

29.7

80 .2*

24.3

24.3*

12. 7

2 1. 6*

42.9

4 1. 6*

196 0

1

·o.o

159.6

31.5

77.5

27.8

22.2

13. 5

21.6

4 7.2

38 . 2

1961

1 L9 . 6

166.6

31.5

80.0

24 . 6

16.5

14 . 0

24 . 6

49.4

45.4

1962

ES. 8

178.2

29.3

80.6

24.4

20.0

13.1

23.6

52 . 0

54. 1

1963

118 .5

179.1

28.2

78.4

24.2

21.8

13.3

24.3

53.0

54. 6

- -- - -- -

*The fi gure s f•l r 1958 and 1959 with the asterisk are the official ones , while the ones without the asterisk are the
estimates . A ll of the figures for 1960-1963 inclusi ve are estimates.
Source : D. J. Dwyer, "China's Recent Harvests," The GeograQhical Journal, CXXX (June, 1964) , 322. Reproduced
from Current Scene , 1964 . Some of the figures are estimates .

.....

"'
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Professor Yuan-Li Wu feels that Communist Chinese statistics
issued before 1958 are underestimates of the grain output and the ones
released after 1958 have an upward bias.

He thinks that China did not

have large stocks in 1950 for there was m rationing system introduced
then, while the official figures sho\\ed that she had withdrawn around
200 million tons, in cumulative totals, from the stocks between 19501956.

output.

Thus, he feels, there is 25 percent underestimate of gross
Again, until 1956 the acreage under cultivation showed a

statistical increase, for there is no accurate reporting system. After
1956 when collectivization had begun the acreage reporting gained

accuracy.

The State Statistical Bt1reau was not established until 1952.

While the cumulative stocks between 1957 and 1961 show some 165
million tons, which sounds inconsistent, Professor Yuan-Li Wu discounts the official figures by 38 percent for 1958 and 28 percent for
1!!60 in Table 2.

1

Between 1953 and 1957 , according to one estimate, the proportion of gross domestic product aris ing from agriculture fe ll
from 45 percent to 38 percent.

In 1960 it fell further to 26 percent,

perhaps because of the overestimate of industrial production and the

Yuan- Li Wu , oo. Cit .. pp. i -l..l-· H 4
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Table 2.

Balance sheet of Chi

~ ·s

c rops

"
"

b.O

0'0

"

]§
a~
& ·s

'<1 (/}
'"-"'
., 0
o;;t;
·~

s"

1950

108. 1

180

245

547

133 . 9

1951

124 . 7

183

245

558

136.6

1952

135.1

184

245

569

139 . 3

1953

154.4

180

245

581

1954

156.9

177

245

1955

160. 5

184

1956

174.8

1957

143.8

+7 . 2

+0. 9

145.4

+6.1

142. 4

+0. 9

146. 5

+4. 1

595

145. 7

+1. 1

142 . 9

-2.8

245

608

148.9

+1. 3

140.4

-8.5

182

245

621

152.1

+1.2

146.1

-6.0

182 .5

185

210

637

141. 8

+1. 1

144 . 9

+3. J.

1958

185.0

175

24"

654

160 . 2

+1. 2

146.8

-13.4

i~5 9

~50 . 0

154

202

66~

14 0.4

+ 1.7

138.6

-1.8

130

150

682

jl' •.

123.5

+15 . 4

!
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Table 2. Continued

196 1

185. 0g

1962

140

14G

693

101. 1

-5 .6

109. 6

+8. 5

160

145

702

103. 5

-3 .2

115.2

+11. 7

a Sour ee: Great Ten Years (Peking, Fore ign Languages Press, 1959) , p.
105.
bit is assumed that there wa s an unde r e stimate of grain production during
1950-1955, and an overestimate of stocks with the government, thus, the
author di s tr ibute s the cumulation t,o tal of grain production over individual
years in the same proportion as the ass umed underrating of equivalent
plan ted during the same pe riocl. Sou n ee : Yuan - Li Wu, The Economy of
Communist China: An Introduction (Ne w York: Frederick A. Praeger,
~ 1965), p . 140 , 146.
~R ations fixed in 1951, were 201 kilogram a year for persons doing light
work, and 25 2 for heavy wor k. Since between 1954-1956 urban population wa s 14 percent of the total and rurla 86 percent. The aver age
comes to At> kilograms per pe rson pe r armum. In 19,57 it was 210
kilogr a ms , and so on. It was varied as shown in Official production
fi gure s . Also see Yu an-Li Wu, ''Farm Crisis in He d China," Current
H istory, XLID (September, 1962), p. 162. (Ration per adult per year in
d kilogr ams . )
P opulation growth is based on officia l estimate through 1957, 2. 2 annual
incre ase for 1958-19 59, 19!!0- 1962 is a little lo wer rate. (Mid-year popul ation in millions).
~On the bas is of pe r cap ita r ati on (e stimate d human consumption).
Total production , minus net exports and the 20 percent of the total offic ially
.ot c iarc<o a s going b waste, seeds , feed and manufacturing. (Total availaUH. . iol humdll

\....UlJOUlUtJ ..,i0ll . )

g:'r,•m unadjusted offiCial figure s (In gr ai n terms, Official production of
r...:.~dh

nf

pu t ~tt oe ::;

in

t•rr:e€ d tn~

,\re ar).
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crisis in agriculture.

During 1960-1962 industrial production fell

sharply, the trend was reversed, and the proportion again rose to
43 percent in 1962 . Net domestic product was higher , since it does
not involve much depreciation- 46 percent in 1953 , 39 in 1957 , 27 in
1960, and 47 in 1962.

1

During 1952-1957, 77 to 78 percent of the population was engaged in agricultural production. Per capita output figures show a
decrease of l. 7 percent in agriculture during the ·period, while
the non-agricultural sector shows a 44 percent increase.

Per capita

output in terms of gross value added in the non-agricultural sector was
3. 7 time s that of agriculture in 19 52 and 5. 5 times in 1957 . 2
During 1952 , 59 percent of China's ex-ports were agricultural
products a nd 23 percent manufactured products of agricultural origin.
In 191>7 the figu res were 40 percent and 31.5 percent, respectively. 3
[t is doubtful that the Chinese officials themselves have a clear
Jdea of

a~ricultural

output, owing to the inaccuracy of the data.

In

ny case. me agricuituml cr isis of 1959 - 1962 manifested that the productivitv had not "increased . although labor inputs had increased.

l .b.ll.'

"Ibid.

l'·

132 .
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Neverthe less , communal accumulation and the other share
capital and works performed on so me of theprojects amounted to some
15 percent of income in 1957 , a nd the per capita personal income probably was arou nd 48 to 56 yuan a year, whi le in 1931-1936 the per capita
rural income was 58 yuan at pre-war prices.

1

Communes as such increased the labor force and the labor
mobility . Thus it made a labor intensive agricultural operation
possible.

But the lack of incentives, commune officials' undue inter-

ference and mismanageme nt, a nd high rate of income savings ratio
brought about an agricultural cris is which was complicated by the bad
weather .

This led to a further increase in the numbe.r of communes

from 24,000 to 100 , 000 in 1962, a nd the number of brigades to 500,000.
Thi.s change was brought about to enable efficie nt operation in smaller
units.

1Ibid. ' p. 151.
A note on the exchange rate of yuan to a dollar wou ld not be out
of place here. One U. S. dollar equaled 3. 839 yuan in 1933,
"'·Lt . ,u.uh J..l• ..._ 9~7 \oi[eL.t..
'.,,the m'lrket rate in Hong
Kong according to one report, was about 5.5 yuan in 1958, 7. 7
)U rtll in 1959, 7. :.<. 10 196 0 and 8. V ;.., l 0f>1 ancl 196?..

22

-p; e I <is and the Technolop;y

Much of China' s cultiva ble land is on slope s and is organized
into te rraces, which do not allo w irrigation or drai nage wi thout some
kind of meC'hanical aid.

Earlier this was done through foot-pedaled

or animal-prope lled water wheels .

~n

1962-1963 China claimed to have

irriaged a bout 50 million hectares, of which 4 . 8 million hectares were
by e lectri cal pumps in 1963 , compared to 3. 4 in 1962. 1 There are no
figures published of diesel pumps , perhaps because of the shortage of
oil.
Indiscriminate irrigation during the "Great Leap" period into
s aline and alkaline lands led to destruction of crops, owing to leakage
of water from canal s into sa lty soil a nd spreading into the fields.

2

Mechanization of agriculture is very desirable in order to raise
the per capita productivity in the fields.

But China's l and, in general ,

is not suited to a high degree of mechanization.

Until 195 8, she had to

1 colina MacDougall , "Power in Communes," Far Eastern
Economic R~ view_, XXXIX (Januar 31 , 1963) , 118 .
2 "Crop and Weather," Far Eastern Economic Revie w, XXXVI
(May 10, 1962). 263 .
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import all her tractors.

From 1915 to 1949 less than 1, 000 tr actors

were imported for use on the experime ntal farms. 1
During the First Plan, 22,000 were imported. In 1960 , the
number of China was at 81, 000 ; 90,000 in 1961 and approximately

100~0 00 (15 h. p . units) by 1962 . 2 Many of these tractors were employed by tracto r stations ; 390 of them were set up during 1953-1957. 3
By the end of 1960 28,000 tractors were employed by 2, 490 large state

farms, which aver aged 2, 100 hectares each. 4
Chemical fertilizer s ar e very important inputs needed to raise
t he productivity of agriculture . Chemical fertilizer production in 1958
was . 811 million tons , while in 1959 it was 1. 78 million, 2. 78 in 1960
and 2 . 20 in 1962, which is supposed to have been doubled in 1965.

China

imported 1. 5 million tons in 1958 and 1. 2 in 1962 . 5

1Henry Lethbridge, "China : Collectivization and Mechanization, "
Far Eastern Economic Review, XXIX (February, 1963) , 309-3 12.

2

Ibid . , and Pe king Review, VI (March I, 1963) 28.

3 Le slie, T. C. Kuo , "Agricultural Mechanization in Communist
China," The China Quarterly, No. 17 (Ja nuary-March, 1964), 134-150.
4 Yuan- Li Wu, op. cit., p. 154.

5Harold Munte - Kaas , "Chh1:1'~ FI<>lds and Factories , " Far
Eastern Economic Review, U (February 3, 1966), 154.
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Recently China has e stablished a nation-wide network of AgroTe chnical Stations, the functions of which a r e to spread improved
te chniques, examine traditional farming methods , train technicians,
and so on. 1

Appraisal

To tap the agricultural s urplus, the Marxist- Leninist model
has advocated a direct state participation, thl'ough the development,
organization and operation of farming .

Through state farms, collective

farms or co-operative farms and communes.

The purpose is to ex-

ploit the anticipated economics of scale ar:d technology as well as direct
supeni i sion and central planning.
The quota system was invented to feed the rising urban population .
The r e quired quota was to be sold to the state procurement agencies before any distribution of the output, at arbitrarily fixed low prices.
There was rationing of food and fibre in the urban-industrial
sector through the means of s tate-controlled retail stores, and consumers ' co-operatives , with r e gu lated wage a nd price control s.

1Henry Lethbridge, "Trends in Chi nese Agriculture , " Far
E c"no m!c R e'new , , L (May J O, l f!< i 'l l. 499- 500 .

E'J~len
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It seems from the above discussion that the Chinese have

merely been able to keep pace with population growth, except for the
disastrous years of 1959-1962 . On way to increase agricultural production in China would be to invest in the reclamation of lands which
can be profitably cultivated. Another would be to expand the production
of fertilizers.

The area under irrigation should be expanded.

Mechan-

ization has a limited application on the Chinese farms, fur the land is
not quite suited for it. At the same time, labor is much cheaper as
compared with machinery and fuel expenses.

Peking will have to ad-

here more and more to labor intensive techniques.

Peasant incentives,

adequate supply of inputs, increasing technical guidance, and coordination of different sectors are pre-conditions of agricultural development in China.

Simultaneously, the "population explosion," which is

a drag on her economy, must be brought under control.
As indicated in Table 2, China's per capita food consumption
has been consistently declining . While her stocks of food grains
have been r· ising in chd1a r d years of 1960- 1962.

'fl1is could be because

China fears that she might get involved in a large-scale war.

Since

China ·s goals are , economic self-sufficiency and a strong national defense,
shc; i s inclined +o hard-press the conq" !l"'r q.
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CHAPTER II

INDUSTRIA L UPSURGE

Sociali zation of Private Bus iness

China gave a high priority to the industrial development , wh ich
le f agr icu l •.1r e to be developed at a later stage.

In order to bring

about a high rate of industrial growth Communis t doctrine advocates
the owners hip of the state over all the means of production , a s the first
step towards the Utopian ideal of reaching the state of society in which
"one co ntr ib(ltes accordi ng to

hl ~

ability and receives a ccording to hi s

nee ds. " Russian Communists sought to bring about a radica l break
from capitalism as s oon a s they came to powe r , but without success.
The Chin" "" attitude toward it , on the other hand , was quite restrained,
Dt

le a ~t

iP

Tn

the beginn ''lg.
1949, arou'lri :•a lf of the Chi nese industrial output and more

tha n th r ee-fo urths of the wholesale and reta il trade we re handled by
p r ivate - e nterprise. 1

. t:

1Georg:e N. Ecklu nd , "Protraeted Expropriation of P r ivate Business
Cu-">.:lU ni.;t China ." ~ '<!fi!i~ ffairs . x-r<G ~ (FPl!. i.96. ' · 238 .

27

To tighten her control over private e nterprises , the P eking
regime launched in 1950 - 1952 the " Wu-fan" or "five-anti" (bribery ,
tax evasions. theft of state pro perty, cheating, and private speculatio n)
and the

" thre <~-anti"

(corruption , waste, and bureaucratism in the Party .

and Gove rnment) movements. 1 Under these programs, 76 percent of
the 160 , 000 merchants were found guilty, in the seven leading
cities in which investigations took place. 2 The private sector was asked
to carry on business only with the Government at fixed prices.

This

gesture of liberalism probably owed its allegiance to the predominant
depe ndence of the economy on the private sector . But it did not last
very long , for it was a product of conve nie nce.
In 1956, all priva te enterprises were brought under direct
state control.
on th<> 'r

<::'J~ a~.l

The owne rs o f the firms were to be paid 5 percent interest
invested from 1956 to 1965 .

The Government the n

1

Ronald Hsi a, "' Private Enterprise in Communist China, "
_?arHic Affair s, XXVI (Dece mber, 1953), 330.
:; Theodor e Hsi - en Chen, "'TI1e Liquidation of P nvate Business
ar as te rn Sur:.':~'. XXIV (June, 1955) ,

h Comm 1n'st China , "
8~-Aa.
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undertook the consolidation campaign.

Thousands of smaller firms all

over China were swallowed up by large organizations. 1
With the disaster of the "great Leap" capitalism , which
possesses the se lf-generating e lements of incentive, re-emerged
in china. with the reintroduction of private plo ts and free markets.

Industrial Performance
The whole of the period under consideration can be divided into
three phases : the rehabilitation period (1950-1952), the First-F ive
Year P lan (1953 -1957)

and the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath .

The r ehabilitation period undertook to restore the economy to
nor mal after World War II , the Civil War, and the post-war inflation.
This implementation of the socialization of private trade , industry,
and land ended in 1956.
Du nng the First Plan, industrial growth was phenomenal,
Althou h official Chinese figures had exaggerated the development by
keeplllg 1952 , a de f. : e< s ed year for trade and industry , as the ir base
year . The " three anti " and " five anti " movements had considerable
ro le to play in slowing down economic activitie s in 1952.

1Ecklund,

Ol' .

cit. , p. 245.

Thus , some
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western economists have taken 1933 as the base year, while others
have taken 1957 as the base year to determine the rate of growth in
China. Again, the tendency with the centralized economies is that
they fix the prices of "new products" unwarrantedly high, at experimental
cost leve ls , and so the data on industrial growth shows an upward bias.
Furthermore, the Chinese Communists do not seem to be considering
the qualitative improvements in their products.

One of the mos t con-

spicuous objections to the reliability of the Chinese industrial statistics
is that they use the gross value of the output as the accounting unit,
rather than the value-adde d approach.

This appr each takes into account

the raw materials and the inte rmediate products.

Thus it tends to

exaggerate industrial growth figures. Changes in gross value may be
an outcome of changes in the compos ition or co mbination of the inputs.
All th ese factors combined make it difficult to arrive at an accurate
rate of industrial development in China.

This method is preferred by

the Chinese Communists , either to impress their subjects and the layoutside-observers; or it is adopted because of the lack of statistical
sophistication on their part.
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Quantitative R ecord

Whatever statistical method is used , the unprecedented high
r a te of industr i al growth is evident.

On e xamining Table 3 on gross

output of modern industry , it beco mes quite clear that within the
Firs t Plan , China doubled her output , although we do not have any
means of inspecting the quality of good produced.
The Chinese gave a very high priority to industrial development
in their F'rst Plan.

The proportion of investment in industry to total

inves tment in the FFYP (1953-1957) was 45 percent , while in 1958, the
first year of the Great Leap , it was 64 . 8 percent . 1
Accordmg to the official Gros s Industrial Output statistics,
th e industrial ou tput as a whole had increased from 34.3 billion (1952
yuan) to
this , thoe.

'1~.4

in 1957 and around 214.2 billion by 1960. Even within

modern industry" output had increased from 22. 1 billion in

1952 to S5 6 m 1957 . while handicraft industry (both factory and cottage)
had increased fro m 12 . 1 billion in 1952 to 22. 8 in 1957.

According to

these figure s, the "modf'r n industry" sector grew 152 . 4 percent over
th per iod (see Table 3) , and ha ndicrafts by 85 . 4 percent.

]_,._l.''C

But western

1Kang Chao , "Indices of Industria l Output in Communist China,"
r ,•• ~· f EconC'rni<•:o an Stati stic'!.: X L · !. ug-o.~st. 1963), 286.

T ab:. 3. Al Lernative esti mates of gross output of modern industry a

Year

1952
19"'3
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
19 59

Official s tatistics
ad jus ted for
" new 2roduct effect"
Value
Index

22 . 0
28.4
33.0
35.6
45.0
49.7

100
129.1
150.0
161. 8
204.6
225.9

"Composite Series"
of es timates based
on functions of
e le ctricity and
finished steel in2uts c
Value
Index

22 . 4
27 8
32. 7
36 . 4
44.7
50 . 0

100
124.1
Hl6. 0
162 . 5
199.6
223.2

L iu-Yeh
es timatesd
Index

Chao Kan~
e stimate s
Index

Chao Kang
Annual rate
of fac to ry
prod. inc .
(perce nt/

100
122. 9
142.2
159.0
2 10 . 8
238 .6
289.2
373.5

100
124.7
141.6
146 . 9
182 . 2
195.9
272 . 6
371.4

24.7
13 .5
3. 7
24.0
7.5
39 .2
36.2

ain b1llion yuans at 1952 prices . 1952 = 100).
Sour ces: bFred C. Hung and Yuan-Li Wu, " Conceptual Difficulties in Measuring China's Industri al Output, "
cThe China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March , 1964) , 61.
" Composite Series," from Yuan-Li Wu , The Economy of Communist China: An Introdu ction (New
d York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) , p. 112.
Ta Chung Liu and Kung Chia Yeh, "Preliminary Estimate of the National Income of the Chinese
Mainland, 1952-1959," The American E conomic R eview Papers and Proceedings, LI (May , 196 1),
ei?· 490.
Chao Kang, "Indices of Industrial Output in Communist Chila," The Review of Economics and
Statistics, XLV (August, 1963), p. 290.
fibid.
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scholars have tempered the rate to the moderate level seen in Table 3.
In any case, the "modern industrial" sector has progressed at a much
higher rate than any other sector of the economy.
The annual rate of growth s hows a highly uneven trend.

The

annual rate of growth is generally lower in the First Plan period than
in the period of economic rehabilitation (1949-1952) and the first two
years of the Second Five Year Plan (1958-1959).

The highest rate

of increase was witnessed in 1958 (39. 2 percent) in the factory production in the whole period under consideration.

The rate of growth

touched its ebb in 1955 wi th an annual rate of increase in factory production of 3. 7 percent and in 1957 or 7. 5 percent (see Table 3, column
5 ).

ln the " composite series" of estimates given in Table 3 Professor Wu ha s used e lectric power and finished steel inputs.
Over the First Plan period, the average annual rate of growth
of UHJ modern industry has been quite variable, according to

the ~

estimates of different western Sinologi s ts . Official estimates claim it
to be 20.3 percent, adjusted official estimates show 17.7 perce nt,
while Professor Wu's "composite series" reveals it to be 17.4 a nd Chao

1Yuan-Li Wu , The Economy of Communist China, p. 113.
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During the period 1952 to 1957, the electrical industry increased
by 21.6 percent , coal by 14 . 6 percent, petroleum by 27.3 percent , ferrous
metals by 28.7 percent, non-ferrous metals by 29.9 percent, metal
processing by 22 . 1 percent, chemicals by 25. 7 percent, building materials
by 19 .3 percent, textiles by 6. 5 percent, paper by 17. 1 percent, while
the food industry and light industrial goods expanded by only 9 . 3 percent
and 11. 8 percent. 1 These figures indicate that consumer goods expanded
much slower than industrial goods.

At the same time , the development

pattern of industries was quite different from that of other developing
countries. In China, unlike other developing nations, textiles is not a
leading industry . Heavy industries are much more emphasized there.
Taking the Great Leap period into account, industrial output took
a substantially big stride in 1958 and 1959 (see Table 3 and 4).

But again,

these tables also reveal that production had increased at a decreasing
rate in the years after 1958.

Official data also concedes the fact.

According to Professor Wu , there was a decline of 74 percent,
in absolute terms, in 1961, and a further drop of 3 percent in 1962.
Professors Hung and Wu have come to a conclusion that the economic

1chao, Kang, op. cit., p. 291.
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Table 4.

Estimates of increases in indu s trial value product 1952-1960
(in percent)

Source
of
estimate

Nature of
value
product

Total increase over
1952-57 1957- 59 1957-60

1958

Increase in
1959
1960

gross

Liu-Yeh
Wu

('52)a
128.4

131. 5

net ('52)a

94 . 2

51. 9

net ('52 )a

89 . 2

58. 1

net ('52)a

85.9

71. 3

ne t ('57)a

Official

~_:g.

Chao Kang

177.3

82.9

66.3

39.2

19.6

27 . 0

19.5

32.3

30.3

31. 5

29.0

15.7

a price
Source: Choh-Ming Li, "China's Industrial Development, 1958-1963,"
China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March, 1964), p. 14.

Table 5.

Estimates of increases in the value of output of modern industry and
handicraft-1952-1959 (in percent)

Source
of
es timate

Value
product
( 1952 price)

Increases over 1952- 57
Modern
Handicrafts

Increases over 1957- 60
Modern
Handicrafts

Liu- Yeh

net

140.2

14. 0

60.4

20.4

_:g.

net

134. 1

12. 5

71. 9

9.3

Chao Kang

net

95.9

Offic ial

gross

Wu,~t

152.4

89 . 6
85 . 4

144.8a

aChoh-Ming Li's interpolation from 1957 official data.
So urce· Choh- ~1i ng I i "China' ~ l ndu q1T i~J Development 1958-1963," China
Quarterly, No . 17 (January-March , 1963), p. 14.
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depression of 1961 and 1962 had died out by the end of 1962, and again
the e conomy had picked up its speed thereafter.

1

Handicrafts

To the Chinese Communists , in confirmity with Marxist dogma,
handicraft signifies a traditional and technically out-dated method of
production which combines labor with a few simple tools and implements
without the aid of machines. 2 Handicrafts do not create surplus value
either, and so they were not attractive to the Communist planners .
As depicted in Table 5, the incre ases in handicrafts were much
smaller than in "mocern industries." During the First Plan , the inc r ease in "modern industries" was substantial, while that of handicrafts
was not as spectacular . While over the period of 1957-1960, handicrafts made a fairly good progress, according to Liu-Yeh estimates,
Wu, s howed it declining.

Official estmates show a considerable

upward tre nd . The first two years of the Great Leap showed a rise,
but Wu , shows that the handicraft valu e product dropped 8. 5 percent

1

Choh-M ing Li, "China's Industrial Development, 195 8-

l9G:l " Thf' Ch ina.:_QL!.l_t.r te rly , No . 17 (January-March , 1964) ,

15 .
2
P eter Schran , "Ha ndicrafts in Co mmunist China," The
China Quarterly, No . 17 (January-March, 1964), 152.
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in 1960 and another 11 percent in 196 1 , because of the agricultura l
crisis.

The decline ended in 1962.

1

Industrial Structure

On examining Chao Kang's figures given earlier in this chapter,
on percentage increase industry-wise, it is qutte evident that increases
in different industries vary spectacularly, but that the metallurgical and
the e nginee ring industries have expanded faster than the textiles and the
consumption industries.
The composition of output, input of fac tors, and the scale of
production give us sifficient information regarding structure . According
to Liu, based on 1952 pr ices, the modern industrial sector' s share in
the domestic product rose from 9 percent in 1933 to 14 percent in 1952
and 24 percent in 1957.

Tha t of agriculture declined from 50 percent

in 1933 to 47 percent in 1952 and 41 percent in 1957 .

2

Thus , the industrial

sector comprised nearly one-four th of the net do mestic product by 1957,

1 choh-Ming Li, "China 's Indus tria l Development, 1958- 1963 , "
p. 16.
?

- 'l a-.__ tmng L1u, :otructura.l Cha nges in the Economy of the
Chinese Mainland, 11 1933 to 1952-57 , 11 American Economic Review
Papers and P roceedings, XLIX (May, 1959) , 86 .
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whil e the figures available for the 1957-1960 period are in gross-value
terms of all industry outputs (Table 6)

Wu estimates show that by 1957

industry contributed 20. 3 percent to the gross national product, and
reached 29.5 in 1959, but declined to 14.5 percent in 1962.

1

The same

source states that agriculture had contributed 39.2 percent in 1957,
32 . 2 percent in 1959, and had risen to 47. 1 percent in 1962.

This

indicates that in the First Plan China had emphasized the industrial
drive , but that the failure of the Great Leap in 1960 brought back the
change toward agricultural development.
The chief bottlenecks that appeared in the industrial development
in 1958-1959 were the low quality of industrial goods produced, agricultural calamities, and lack of adequate transportation.
A number of new varieties of products have appeared in China,
such as aircrafts , radio-electronic apparatus , television sets, hightensile structural steel , chemical fibre, and 72 , 500 k. w. hydroe lectnc power-genera ting e quipment .
with uneven

industri~.l

These new products, along

development in China , have change d the eompo -

s i tJon of her outputs consicl<>rably.

OF cia! da ta on mdus trial structure , 1957 - 1960 (in 19 57 price s )
J·· m

·-

- ·- - - --

--

.r ,,s s value <lf all- industry ou):pu t
lin billior yuan \

o np<.stti on by
r , :luc·t,on me thod
L . IodeJ'n
?. . Aanriic rafts
'} aa1u ·e o!· or oduc t
1.. HeaH indus try
~.
r igh ~ .ndus try
ly lp,.. r a ting organiza ti on
L. Indu.;tr ia.l depart ments
l. P eople 's communes
a. Rural
b. Ur ban
By level of control
l. Cen tr al
2 . Local

J9 f>7

l958

1959

1960

- - ---- -- - -· -- - - - -- - - -- - - - 70.4

U 7.1

63. 0

210.0

ln pe r centage
- - -- - - ----"'"-==
="""-------- -

70. 6
29.4

74 .5
25 .5

74. 6
25.4

48.4
51.6

57.3
42.7

58 . 7
41.3

60. 5
39.5

100.0
0
0
0

94 .7
5.3
5.0
0.3

92. 7
7.3
6.1
1.2

91.0
9.0
7.1
1.9

46 . 0
54.0

27.0
73.0

26.0
74.0

Sour ce: Choh-Ming Li , "China's Industrial Development, 1958-1963 ," China Quarterly, No. 17 (JanuaryMar ch, 1964), p. 14.
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Changes in input structure are obvious from the relative increase in capital and labor .

During the first quinquennium, the in-

c rease in the fixe d capital i n industry amounted to 21,400 million
yuan (at 1952 prices ) , while in 1958 it is es timated to be 11 , 763. 1
Again . it is esti mated from th e above figure s that by the end of 1958
the amount of fixed capital in the e ntire industrial sector was around
47 , 483 million yuan (at 1952 prices).

2

Thus , the amount of fixed

capita l assets per worker for the industrial sector was raised from
4 , 064 yuan in 1952 to 8, 472 yuan in 1958.3
The higher degree of mechanization aggravated the shortage of
ski ll ed lnbor.

Although the number of industrial graduates had tripled

during 1953-1957 , they were only 2. 2 pe rce nt of the total industrial
emp loy ment in 1957 .

This is anothe r handicap in China's industri a l

effor ts.
In the F ir st Plan , the e mphasis was on the Central Governmentoperated enterpri s es, but Ta bl e 6 shows that from 1957 onwards the tre nd
had r evPrsed .

l

Rona ld Hsia , "Gro wth a nd Structural Changes of Chinese
Industry , " Conte m orar China , Ill (19!;0) , 60 .
2 Ibid.
:li bi d
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Again from Table 6, we can conclude that the emphasis on the
development of the heavy industries has been affected since 1958, but
the gross value-product has increased from it by 1960. It may be owing to the longe r gestation period required for the heavy industries to
run at capacity.
There seems to be a gradual trend of decentralization in the
operating or ganization in the industrial field.

This may have been

a consequence of the policy of "walking on two legs" implemented in 1958.

Iron and 1cc l l.Jclustry

A large-scale industrial development program in a cou ntry
cannot be carried out without establishment of an iron and steel
industry.

By developing the iron and steel industry, other allied

industries will also be stimulated.

Major raw materials needed for

the steel industry are iron ore, coal, and scrap.
Since the stee l industry has the greatest total linkage, Peking's
plarmers gave it the utmost priority in allocation of materials, labor,
and transportation facilities.

There was a r ising demand for steel for

farm 'mplements, transports stems, n w urban and rural commune~oonsored

industries, and other construction projects.
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Iron ore reserves of China a r e estimated to be 1 ,484 to 1, 82 1
million tons by V. C. Juan.

1

Muzaffer Er Selcuk of tbe University

of Purdue estimates it a t approximately 4 , 338 million tons, contai ning
1, 537 million tons of metallic iron. 2 Of tbis estimate, around 3, 189

milli on tons containing 1000 million tons of iron is in Manchuria . Only
20 percent of this total is shown to be "economic ores" (ore that can
be turned into pig iron at $60 or less per ton). 3
China has sufficient reserves of limestone, dolo mi te, manganese,
tin, copper, zinc, tungsten , and otber raw materials to meet tbe demands
on tbem to develop tbe steel indus try rapidly. China does not have
sufficient quantities in earlier days.

11ms, China imports scrap from

otber countries - especially Japan.
The First Five Year Plan target of 4-12 million tons of steel
a nd 4. 7 million tons of pig iron were surpassed by 1956. 4 The production
of crude iron, by indigenious me th ods, also rose from 30,000 tons in

1 vei Chow Juan, "Miner al Resourees of China, " Economic
Geology, XIJ (June-July , 1946) 405.

2

Muzaffer Er Selcuk, " The Iron a nd Steel Industry in China ,"
Economic Geography, XXXII (O ctober, 1956), 347.

4 Theodore Shnbad, "Chi na's Yea • n' the 'Great Le~p Forward " Far Eastern S~ •:.~
ill (Ju•1e. 19!>9: 92 .
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1952 to 593 , 000 tons in 1957.

Local pig iron production also exceeded

the planned target of 1. 730,000 tons for 1958.
By the end of 1957 , the Soviet-bui It plants contributed appro ximate ly 57 percent of Chi na ' s stee l production and 50 perce nt of coal
output ,

1

a lthough Russians had constructed only 3 of the 15 iron and

steel e nterprises planned for the period and only 27 out of 194 of th e coal
plants planned.

2

This indicates that the Russian plants were larger

a nd more efficient than those built by th e Chinese , and that the F i rst
Five Year Plan could not have been successful without them.
Al the same time, the production of pig iron increased from
1. 9 mi lli on tons in 1952 to 5. 9 million tons in 1957, and that of steel

rose from 1. 4 to 5. 4 during the same pe riod. 3
In 1958, when the "Great Leap" was formulated , the People's
Daily r eported that regime's plan to develop 200 small converters and
13 , 000 iron smelting furnaces by th e e nd o f 195 8.
This small industry drive was planned to add 10 milli o n metric
tons of steel-producing c apacity and 20 million tons of pig - iron - producing

1
Sidney Klein , "Recent Economic Exper ience in India and
Commu nist China: Anotlwr Inte rpre tation ," American Economic
Hev1""' i'apers and Proceedings , LV '~"c' 1965) , 36.

3 Theodore Shabad, Joe . c1t.
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capacity. It was claimed in September , 1959, to have achieved only 4
million tons increase in steel and 10 million in iron by the summer of
1958.

1

In 1957 , the production of stee l ingots had reached only 5. 4 and

pig-iron 5. 9 million. tons ; by 1958, they had reached a new height of 11
and 13.7 million tons, respectively. 2
Tbis policy of over-emphasis on steel production led to interindustry imbalance.

By the end of 1958, the output capacity of steel

industry was twice the steel demanded for the mad! ine-building
industry.

3

In 1959, 20. 5 million to ns of pig-iron were reported to have been
produced, out of which around 1.1 million tons were produced by the small
"modern" blast furnaces (which numbered around 1. 300 in 1960 bu ilt during
1958-1959 . 4 Out of the total steel production of 13. 35 million tons, about
4. 72 mi!IJOn , or 28 percent, came from small Bes semer converters.

5

1Yuan- Li Wu, "Industriali zation under Chinese Communism,"

Current History, XXIX (December , 1960), 344.
2

Ibid.

3Ronald Hsia , "Economic Changes in Communist China ," The
Political Quarterly , XXV (July-September , 1964) , 307.
4

Ibid. , p. 346 .
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This means that instead of 9. 53 million tons of pip;-iron produced in
1958, from the "large" iro n and stee l mills, it had dropped to 9. 5

million, while steel production had inceeased from 1958 production of
million tons to 8. 63 million tons in 1959.
The quality of iron and steel produced from the "small" plants
and the " backyard furnaces " was drastically poor.

Thus came the end

of the "Great Leap Forward. "
In 1960, Chinese official reports claimed the total production
of steel to be at its new height of 18.5 million tons.

1

Of course , this

included both the "large" and the "s mall " indigenous furnace production.
I was later confessed that about 28 to :JO percent of the 196U leve l of
production was not usable.

2

Although China has not published her steel production figures
since l::lbv , vis itors to that country have observed that her major iron
and steel fi r ms ar e still operating at o nly about 50 to 60 percent of their
torme r capacity.

3

I

'A lexandra Close , "China Streamlines her Steel ," Far Eastern
Economic Review, XXXXVJJ (March 4, 1.965) 365.
2
Colina MacDougall , " h n1 ~· '-t riv Progr ess , ..
rcoP'> mic Review , LI (December 2, 19 5), 423.

F:ar_Eas~!_n
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Peking claimed that she was forced to cut down her steel
production in 1961 , because of the exhaustion of raw materials - limes to ne , coal and iron ore.

Never thel ess. it was a tremendous waste

of manpower as well as the raw materials in the Great Leap Forward
years.

Secondly, she stated that the steel producing machinery had de-

teriorated and needed replacements and repairs . Naturally , this was
the . direct consequence of the withdrawal of the Soviet aid and experts
in 1960.

The majority of her small plants, which had sprung up like

mushrooms in the 1958-1960 period , gradually turned into ashes and
rocks.

China's low quality steel and iron production failed to meet

the requirements of certain specialized industries.

This was reflected

in the rising imports of iron and steel plates and sheets, tubes, pipes,
and so on, from Britain.

The value of such imports increasingly

mounted from 701.889 in 1962 , to 2, 322. 556 in 1963, and 2, 676.712
in 1965 . 1

·!Ibid. , p . 366 .
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Coal Indu stry

Leaving aside the vast manpower, coal is the most important
source of energy m

hina, because so far a ll the other alternative sources

have rot been exploited e nough . Although the hydro-electric power pote ntial
is very lar ge , it demands a high level of imtial investme nt.
To meet the increasing demand for power in an industrializing
cou ntry, the Chinese planners are faced with the problems of development of alternative sources , expansion of coal production, and deve loping new coa l mines so as to elimi nate the cost of transportation and thus
red uce the coal consumption by rai Iways.

In 1960 . 40 percent of the

total freight on railways was coal, amounting to about 288 million tons,
out of the total output of 400 million tons.
Chi na's reserves of coal had been esti mated by tbe National
Geographical urvey in 1945 to be 265 , 311 million tons, but the
Chinese clai med it to be l, 500,000 million tons in 1959.
Prior to the u tbreak of the Si no-Japanese

Wr~r

in 1936, coal

production in China and Ma nchuria had reached the estimated level of
36 million tons.

Owing to the wartime productio n drive, it had reached

60 mil wn tons by 1943 .

The Civil War

wh1cb fo llowed reduced the output
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to 15 million tons by 1946 . 1 By 1949, the figures had recovered to 32
million tons.

By 1952 , the dPmancl for coal was so great that the cur -

tailme nl of dJrect consump ti on of coal and rationing to households was
the only means of redressing the balance . 2
Much of the rehabilita tion process during the 1949- 1952 period
was carried out with Russi an assista nce.

By 1950 , half of the mine s

had been calimed to have been mechani zed in Manchuria.

3

The Russians

agreed to equip 27 coal mines and coal washing plants and extend expert
advice in the field during the First F ive Year Plan.

The Plan envisaged

to increase the capacity to 112 . 9 million tons from the 1952 level of 66.5
million .

The Plan targe t was fu rthe e raised by 53. 85 million tons .
In 1950 , the output obtained t.brough mechanized means accounted

for only 4 percent of the total.
33 . 6 perce nt.

4

By 1954 , the same figure had rise n to

It bas been claimed th a t by the end of 1958 , 90 percent of

the lifting work and 97 percent of the ex1racting work was done by machines

1

D. J . Dwyer. "The Coa l lnrhmtry in Mainland Ch.ina Since 1949 ,"
The Geographical Journal , CXXJX (September, 1963), 331.

3

4

":::oa t," China New A.1al

~i_s ,

Th£udcre Shabad, China ' s

Pr;wg<>r , l9f>6) ,

p.

56 .

No. 167 (February 8. 1957) , 4.

Changi n~ (New Yor k: Frederick
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in the larger mines.

1

Introduc tion of hydraulic mining was an im-

portant innovation employed in the larger mines.
Coal production forged up from 64. 7 million tons in 1952 to almost the double the level (130 million tons) in 1957. 2
11w 1958's "walking-on-two -l egs" policy of the "Gr eat Leap"
encouraged local production by indigenous means.

The number of local

mines increased from 20,000 to 110 ,000 in 1958 alone; and some 20
million people were working on it.

The number of large mines (capacity

above 30 , 000 tons per annum) were a lso increased.
The coke production rose from 8 million tons in 1957 to 23
million in 1958, but about 70 percent of the 1958 output came from
indigenous mines, and so of low quali ty, mixed coal and rocks. 3
This uneconomic situation was recognized in 1959 and about 80
percent of th e number of coal pits and 70 perce nt of the workers were

1

owyer, op. cit., 332.

2

Choh-Ming Li , " Economic Deve lopme nt ," The China Quarterly,
No. 1 (January-March, 1960) 40; and Everett D. Hawkins , "China's
Fuel and Power," Current History, XXV (Dece mber, 195 8) , 337.
3Andrew Nathan, " China's Lagging Coal Mines," Far Eastern
Econonh c ReYiew, XXXXII (November 14, 1963), 354.
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reduced in that year.

1

Neve rtheless , the production of small mines

had increased from 102. 6 million tons in 1958 to 142. 6 in 1959, and to
261.2 in 1960, which amounted to 38,41 , and 65 percent of the total

for each year, respectively.

The more promising mines were mechanized. 2

The better quality of coal from the " large" mines rose from
167.4 million to 205.2 in 1959, but declined sharply to 138 . 8 million

tons in 1960, owing to lack of co-ordination in planning and transportation facilities.

Coal had piled up at the mines.

Industrial consumption of coal in 1952 was 32 million tons,
wh ich rose to 69 by 1957; and similarly, demand of coal for heating
and cooking rose from 24 lo 52 million tons in the same period . 3

Transnort

,,part from the government weaknesses, the lack of an adequate
transport system is the chief cause of China's backward s tate of industrialization l>ofore 1949. 4 In China, the transport network is fairly well

2
(Jun

" F'uel Industry: Producti on , " China News Analysis, No. 371 ,

2., 1961)

3

2.

n wyer , lac. cit.

Murphev . "China's Trnnsport Problem and Communist Planni ng,"
Economic Geography , XXX
(January 1956). 11 .
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developed in the eastern coastal region, where industries and commerce
flourished , but the hinterland has lacked transportation facilities.
RailwayR did not develop fast enough-probably because the
volume of goods transported r e mained almost stationary .

Thus,

the railroads, instead of earning greater profits, often entered into cutthroat competition with the existing means of transportation. 1 This was
especially true in the 1930's.
On the local level , animal- and human-drawn carts, carrying
poles. and such traditional means of transportation still form the backbone of China's distribution system, without which it would collapse.

2

In 1949, the Peking regime undertook to restore the lines
damaged during the war.

Nearly half of the more than 17, 000 miles of

operable railroads in 1952 were in Manchuria.

The First Five Year

Plan announced the target of adding 125,000 miles of new railway .
Excluding Formosa, China had 17 ,5 70 miles of railroads at the end
of 1952 .

This amounts to one mile of railroad for every 216 square miles

1

sun. "The Pattern of RaiiWlly Development in China," The Far
Eastern Quarterly XIV (February. 195B) 191.
2Harold Munt.e-Kaas. "Roads a nd Rails in China," Far Eastern
!:co n· l!hC Review , U (Februar • 17 , 1%1>) ~n5 -276.
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of territor y and 39 miles of tran s portation for every 1, 000,000 people. 1
On an average , approximately 1, 000 ki.lometers of railroad
was constructed annually between 1949 and 1958 . The rate slowed down
after th a t , a nd only 800 kilometers were constructed between 1960 and
1962. Annually , about 1 , 300 k. m. were added between 1962 and 1965 .
Sinkiang was joined to the network in 1963.

Perhaps the total mileage

of the railroads in China is around 36,000 kilometers in 1966 (excluding
the forest railways)

compared to 31,000 in 1958.

2

China's largest locomotive plant is at Dairen.

She produced

steam locomotives of about 3, 000 h. p. until 1963, but since 1965 she
has started producing 600 to 2 , 000 h. p. diesel locomotives.

In 1958,

it was reported that China produced 350 of her own locomotives.
Passenge r cars in operation may be around 10,000, and freight cars
about 150. 000 . In 1960 , China bought 50 steam locomotives from the
U.S.S.R. , and in 1960 , 5 electric locomotives from France, who also
electrified a 90 k. m. line in Szechuan Province.

1

2
3

E-Tll Su n , op. , cit., p. 179.
Harold Munthe-Kaas ,

Ibid .

~ , p.

276.

3
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Between 1949 and 1964, more than half the goods transported
was done so by railroads, especially heavy industry and capital construction goods, such as coal, minerals, construction materials, timber,
cotton, and foodstuffs.
As regards highways, the last figures issued on mileage were
in 1958, being 400,000 k. m. as compared to 227,000 km. declared as
fit for trucks in 1957. 1 Today they are estimated at 550,000 km. of
which 200,000 km. are paved.
F oreign visitors estimate about 250 to 300 thousand trucks,
about 10 thousand buses , and 40 to 50 thousa nds passenger cars running
on the Chinese roads.

Chinese official production of cars in 1957 was

7 , 500 . In 1964 the figure was 20,000, and in 1965 25,000 . 2 In 1965
China imported from Russia 13 , 666 motor trucks, 1, 159 passenger cars,
5 busses , and automobile parts, for a total amounting to 38, 824 thousand
rubles.

This total dropped to 5 , 048 rubles, consisting of 710 trucks,

30 cars , and spare parts in 1961.

In 1962, some 1,619 trucks and 141

cars were imported worht 8,204 thous a nd rubles. 3

1
Ibid .• p. 325.
2

I bid., p. 326.

colina MacDougall, "China: Motor Pick-Up, "
E conomic Review, XXXXIIII (Apri l 2, 1964). 40.
3

!~!:....~~~.!!.
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Petroleum Tnrlustrv

China, as such, is very fortunate as far as endowment of
petroleum is concerned.

In the pre-war era, China's petroleum pro-

duction had reached its peak of 320 , 000 metric tons in 1943.

In 1949,

it had fallen down to 122,000 tons , a nd thereafter recovered to 436,000 tons
in 1952. 1
Tile F irst Five Year Plan (1953-1957) had put up its larges t
at 2 million tons.

Despite the heavy capital investments, the performance

was not up to the mark.

Actual annual output more than doubled between

1952 and 1955, to 966, 000 tons, but reached the level of only 1. 41

million tons by 1957, giving an increase rate of 325 percent for the whole
period . 2 It was, nevertheless, calcuated by keeping a low base figure .
During this period, the inexperience of the Chinese labor force
in this fiel d , shortage of petroleum technologists, and poor quality of
equipment used r e sulted in the s low progress in this industry.

Poor

performance in the production during the First Five Year Plan led the

1

Brian Heenan , " China's P etroleum Industry (II)," Far
Eastern Econom1c Review , L (Octob 1 14, 1965) , 93 .
2 rbid.
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policy-makers of Peking to raise the target for the Second Plan to 5
and 6 million tons by 1962 . 1
In 1959, the official Chinese c la im had risen from 2. 26 million
to 3. 7 million , and by 1960 it further expanded to 5 . 5 million tons, according to a Russian journal.

2

There have been no official figures released after 1960, and
the available estimates are varying.

In light of new discoveries claimed,

development of older oil fields, better equipment supplied and greater
trained labor force, better transport system, it is estimated that the output re ached 6. 5 million tons in 196 1, 6. 8 to 7 million in 1962 , and 7. 5
million in 1963. 3
Chinese official data refer to the total oil output and m ake
no distinction between synthetic and liquid oils.

Foreign visitors estimate

that about a third of China's home production of all oils come from coal

1 Colina MacDougall , "China: The Oil Scene," Far Eastern
Economic Review , XXXIX (January 10 , 1963). 51.
2

.
Ib1d.

:3 Heenan, op . c it. . p . 94.
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and shale. On this basis , We i estimated that about 2 million tons of shale
oil was produced in 1961. 1
Quite a number of new r efi neries have been established since
1957.

The ones at Lanchow and Shanghai are among the large ones.

The oil refining capacity is not ye t lmown.
This drive for production increase in oil shows China's desperation to become self-sufficient in her petroleum supply.

In 1958, the

volume of imported oil exceeded domesti.c production.

Two-thirds of

China ' s estimated output of 7 million tons was imported in 1963 .

2

Oil ba s been one of the most important items of the SinoSovie t trade.

In 1950 it accounte d for 12 percent of the total annual

import trade by value and was placed third in importance after the
"complete plants" and the "other e quipment. " By 1960 it topped the list
and accounted for one-third of the value of all imports from the U.S.S.R.
Since the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1960, Sino-Rumani an trade has
more than tripled, and Rumania is likely to replace Russia as the source

1Anton W. T. Wei, "Minerals in China 1961 . " The Mining
Journal (London} April 6 , 1962, p. 3 ; F •·om Heenan, loc .. cit.; a lso
Theodore Shebad , "Chlna's Year of the Great Leap Forward." Fa r
Easter·n Survey, XXVITI (June, 1959}, 94.
2Heenan , loc. cit.

56

of oil.

China is getting some crude oil from Albania , and is searching

for some oil from Alge ria a lso.
The amoun t of oil avail a bl e for consumption has risen from 3. 2
million tons in 1957, to 8. 8 million in 1960, and 9. 7 million in 1963.
Domestic production may have supplied 44 pe rce nt in 19 57 , 62 percent
in 1960 , and more than 70 percent of consumption demands in 1963.
This shows that China is striving hard to depend less on foreign sources
for her oil.

1

Assuming a population of 700 million, and the oil available
for consumption being 9. 7 million tons in 1963, the annual per capita
consumption of oil is 4-5 American gallons, much below 17 -2 0 gallons
average for the whole of the Far E a st , J apa n (130 ga llons) , the Soviet
Union (200 gallons) and the United States (900 gallons).

2

Most of China's oil fields are situated in the deep west , while
the overwhe lming demand comes from the industrial east. Since China's
transport system is not yet well developed, distribution of oil is a problem the economy continues to face.
As China be comes further indu s trialized, she will have to increase her supply of petroleum.

1

Ibid. ' p . 95.

57

CHAPTER ill

THE COURSE OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

The First Five Year Plan

How could China, a country with such meage r per capita income , procure such a high rate of indu strial development ? Will s he
be able to sustain such a high rate of growth for a long period of time?
These are the questions posed by many individuals in developing countries .
Further answers to these questions are at tempted in the chapter on capital
formation.
In the pre-Communist era, Ch ina's industries were co nsumer
oriented ; the heavy industries, transport system , and the power supply
ind ustrie s were le ss developed.

China , like most other deve loping

nations, had to depend on free international trade for her economic
needs . According to T. C. Lin and K. C. Yeh , the consume r's goods
industries produced 81. 9 percent while producer's goods industries'
output was 18. 9 percent of the total output of the modern industrial sector.
Factories (modern sector) produced 0. 64 billion (1933 yuan) worth
oi output in 1933, and handicraft produced 2. 04 billion worth i n the same
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year.

1

owned.

I 1 1936, 74 percent of the total industrial capital was foreignThe confiscation of the Japanese-owned firms after the Sino-

Japanese War hiked state-owned capital to 67.3 percent, as compared
to 32. 7 percent private capital. 2 The capital market and business ad ministration were not well developed during this period. Thus, China possessed
the commonly found characteristics of an underdeveloped country.
No sooner had the Communists taken over in 1949 than they
brought about revolutionary changes :n the economy.

They uprooted the

ancient institution of private property . The land the industrial enterprises were socialized by 1956. In their First Five Year Plan, they
gave a very high priority to the industrial sector and committed themselves to obtaining the support of the people.

This emphasis on in-

dustrialization was mt prudent on the part of the planners.

By 1956,

prices in general had risen five times since 1936; and the prices of
scarce producer's goods were higher than the rest. 3 Thus, the prices

1 Ta-Chu ng Liu and Kung- Chia Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese
Mainland: National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1959 (Prince ...
ton , New J ersey: Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 66.
?

~ v"""l -Li

3

Wu, The Economy of Communist China, 117.

choh- i\.L L
, Economic Development of Communist China:
An Appraisal of :•,, F ir'3 t Five Years of Industrialization (Berkeley,
California: · Uni··;,o"sitv of California Press, 1959), p . 42.

Table 7.

China's petroleum imports, 1950-1963

(M/T ons 1000)
From the
U.S.S.R.

From
Rumania

1950

1957

1958

19 58

1960

1961

1962

1963

38.9

380.4

672.0

636 . 9

567 . 6

Oil products

144.3

1422. 2

1835. 3

2412. 3

2395. 2

2428.2

1856.4

14 08. 0

Total

183.2

1802.6

2507.3

3048.2

296 2. 8

2928.2

1856 J4

1408.0

350.0

700.0

3312.8

3628.2

Crude oil

Total

Grand total

1000.0a 1300.0
2856.4

2708.0

aEs timated
Source: Brian Heeman, "C hina ' s Petroleum Industry II ," Far Eastern Economic Review, L(October 14 ,
1965), p. 94.
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of inrlusl l'ial
t!O ll lll.l'iCS.

~ood s

were much higher in China than in other industrial

.J i<> implies lhal the emphasis give n to rapid industria l

clevclopmonl in Chi na had unde rmined the importance of reaping comparative advantage through international trade which would have been
possible , had it been a fr ee-economy.

Consequently , the cost of r a pid

industrialization was high. A major share of this cost in ter ms of be lowsubsistence consumption was forced upon the people of China by her
leaders.
The share of producer's goods rose to 43 percent in 19 52 from
18.9 in 1933 , and further to 57 in 1957. In 1959, 69 percent of total
industr ial prorluction consisted of producer's goods . On the other hand,
the share of handicrafts had fallen during the First Five Year Plan.
On th e one hand , a production drive e mphasis was
heavy industr ia l sector.

·~ i'

<>non the

On the other ha nd, the re was a lack of co-

ordination in inter-industry planning. During the last two years of the
First Plan , there was a shortage of electric power, crude oi l , iron a nd
steel , coal and such basi c industrial inputs.

The supply had not in-

creased e nough to meet the rising demand of machine tool and me tal
working industry.
Among the light industries, only the paper industry had exceeded
its quota.

Th e remaining ones in this category fared poorly, such as
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cotton cloth , sugar, wheat flour .

These are the goods of daily use for the

people.
As stated earlier, the initial rise in physical output during the First
Plan was ov.ing to the expansion of the industrial labor force.

Later, the

increase in productivity was a factor that played an important part, as
technical experience was obtained.

This may not be so for the Great

Leap years.
The Great Leap was c haracterized by the indigenous techniques
of production , labor-intensive methods, and small-scale local operations.
According to official sources, three-fourths of the economy's coke, onehalf of its iron ore and pig iron , one-third of its crude steel , and onesixth of its ce ment was produced by these methods in 1959.

1

But about

30 to 40 percent of output by this method was found of too low a quality
to be of any use.

The Great Leap psychology had led the planners a nd

the local auUwrities to revise the targets upward during the 1958-1959
period, which dislocated the planning machinery.
labor was used highly uneconomically.

During this period,

For instances, it took 50 to 60

days to turn out one metric ton of poor quality iron from a tiny local

1Ronald Hsia, "Economic Change in Communist China," The
Poli'ic::tl Quarterly, XXXV (July-September , 1964), 301.
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furnaceJ A ~cording to Kang Chao. in 1958, more than 100 million
peop le was mobilized to construct dams , irrigation pr.o.iects. and so
on, without advance survevs and proper des igns. 2 Millions of people
were eng"aged in digging iron-ore and coal from the indigenous mines
and constructing " back-yard furnaces" which were destroyed with the
end of the Great Leap .
There was an enormous waste of labor power as well as the
industrial raw materia ls . Some i ndustries had over-produce d , while
others cou ld not work their pla nts at capacity.

The inadequate trans-

port system ap;gravated the s itua tion. As a resu lt, the indus tr ies in
Communist China e ngaged th emselves in a vertical diversifica tion after
19:>8.

Under decentrali zed ad ministration, they established "satelli te

plants" around the main plants in order to supply the main plants with
mater ials needed. Thus , railway bureau s began to run cement plants,
steel mill s, a nd so on.

Ce ment mills began to build paper mills and so

on to supply their own needs . 3 In about one year, thousands of industry

1Fro m Peking Review, March 3, 1959, p. 5. quoted by Honald
H 1< 1 ~ ,

l!Jid .

2 Chao Kang , "Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap i n
L .... l.La

l... ... t

Clue; , 0

sian Survey, J,- 'iVI·, ,·, l m:i4)

3Ibid . , pp . 85 tH~5 7 .

854.

63

complexes grew up like mushrooms, trying to produce multitudes of
material inouts that the nucleus plants were in short supply of.

The

agricultural crisis and the disequilibrium created by the policy of
"walking on two legs" brought an end to the Great Leap.

Great Leap Backward

With the withdrawal of Soviet technical a nd material aid in 1061 ,
the policy of the industrial priority was shifted to agricultural priority.
With this returned a greater reliance on such capitalistic elements of
agricultural improvements as keeping production cost under control,
improvement in quality of goods produced, greater emphasis on technical training , expansion of the fertilizer industry, farm machinery production, and so on.
In 1962, the uutput of stee l rose 7 million tons, and chemical
fertilizers 2. 05 million tons.

Other pre liminary estimates have claimed

the aggregate output of modern industry at 72 billion yuan in 1962.

This

is equal to 76 percent of the 1960 output of 94. 5 billion yuan. 1 Al though
figures have not been released since 1960 , it is expected that industrial
production may have fallen to a low of 39 . 1 billion yuan in 1961. 2 This

1Yuan-Li Wu , The E r.onomv of Con1munist China, p. 123.
"I'

64

indicates that the reorientation of policy did help the economy in picking
up again, after the confusion of the "Great Leap" and the depression that
followed it.
The Chinese Communists realized after the Great Le ap that
econom ic deve lopment was nol some thinll; that they could achieve as
fast as they expected.

The Great Leap was undertaken with the aim

of surpassing the British level of output within the following fifteen years;
but their experi ment left them frustrated.
planners were sobered.
indeed!

After 1961, the Chinese

From that point , their targets were moderate
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CI!APTER IV

CAPITAL FORMATION

The rapid rate of industrial growth in China during the First
Plan owes its alligiance to the high rate of capital for mation in the
country.

This was made possib le in China through the coercive

methods by the Communi sts.
Capital accumul atio n presupposes an increase in the volume
of real savings, so that the increase in production id directed into investment programs. It also presupposes finance and credit facilities
to enable the inves tment programs to be carried out. Again , it assumes
that profitable i nvestments are made, so that further accumulation i s
made postiiule .
WhJ ,~

capi tal-output ratios vary in different countries, a

group of Uniled Nations experts used a ratio ranging fro m 2:1 to 5:1. 1
Th e Indian five - year plan suggested an average capital -output ratio of
3:1 , Professor Kurihara assumes a 5:1 ratio, and Rosenstei n-Hodan

1

United Nations, Measures for the Economic Development of
Und<o-rae·leloped Areas (, 'e w York., 1951) , p. 47.
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esti mates that the ratio is at least 3: 1 or 4: 1. 1 It is the ratio tha t shows
the relationship between the units of input of capital and the resulting
o utput of goods.
Assume that a given capital-output ratio is 3:1, and the rate of
increase in population growth is 2 percent. If a country wants to raise
its pe r capita ' income by 2 pe rcent , she should be saving and investing
3 x 4 perce nt , or 12 percent of its national income every year.
There are a number of ways by which capi tal accumulation
can be increased.

One way is to restrict domestic consumption,

through a high rate of taxation. A s econd is through compulsory saving
schemes - se lling people government securities and so on.

A third

device is restriction of the leakage through imports as the per capita
income rises a nd the margina l propensity to import and the diversification of demand rise.

Development through inflation is a fourth method,

as prac ticed in Brazil.

This c ould be a dangerous way of developing a

nation if the inflation gets out of hand.

A fifth technique is the removal

of disguised unemployed labor fr om the agricu ltural and other sectors
to th e industrial sector, where the produ ctivity is higher; or their

1

Gerald M. Me ier and Hobert E. Baldwin, Economic Development:
Iheo s:,c , Histo ry , Policy (New York: J ohn Wil ey & Sons, Inc., 1957) ,
~\

:,:· ~ .
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transferral to the building of social overheaa eaptlal projects.

Such a

move ment would have to be accompanied by a rise m productivity in
the agricultural sector, so as to feed this increasing non-agricultural
labor force . 1t

ai~o

pre-supposes the pr ese nce of incentives for the

agricuitu1'IH !aoorers to work harder-putting in more hours of work.
F or e tgu ocononnc aid can also help the oounu y in breaking through the
vicious circle of poverty. It can release domestic resources for investment purposes.

Lastly, international trade is an important means

of capital formation, nevertheless, it is not absolutely essential to
have a favorable term of trade for economiC development of a country .
With an improvement in the terms of trade a country can earn greater
imports . It can give priority to c apital imports over consumption goods .
H can e mphasize export mdustries in order to create an export surplus.

A developmg nation often imposes exchange controls, tariffs, and other
controls to pr event valuable foreign exchange from being used in purchasing coll sum 1.,io n goods or relatively less productive capital goods.
A low capi ta l-output ratio is also important in increasing

s aving~.

for

it s hows no w much capital is n eded per uni o increase in output. A
lo w ra ti o i ndicates the productiviiy of capital.
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Capital Inves tment

China 's rapid industrialization program was carried out dm ing
the first plan , followed by a sort of boom during the Great Leap, nncl then
a slump after 1959. An attempt is made here to determine the rate of
investment and the utilization of funds by s ectors. E xternal econom1c aid
will be dealt with in a later chapter.
Fixed investment is defined to include a ll additions a nd maj or
repairs to buildings and productive faciliti es . It excludes changes in
inventories a nd procurement of mil itary equipment.
Under the Chinese Communist system the government makes
the base inves tme nt decis ions for the who le eeuno my . About 12,000
m illion yuan was inves ted by pr ivate business me n and peasants.

About

60 percent of this went into investments in fixed assets. 1 This amount
became insignificant by the end of 1956, whe n the socialization of private
busines s was completed .
Total domestic gro ss savings mounted steadily (with one hPtback
in 1955) and have averaged 22 percent of GNP in the past few years .

2

1 Far Eastern Economic Review, XIX (January 2, 1958), 13.

2
Wilfred Malenbaum J "Indian and China: Contrasts in Development
P edor.mance , " The AmericatEconomic Review, XLIX (June , 1959), il04.
1
Pro!. Me ' enbaum take s in to ~ c~nu nt t.he fir ~t phtn ~nd the year l 'lf\S in
f•
.... ,
f !7" re.
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At the same time, China's population has been rising at a rate of 2 to
2 1/ 2 percent.

1

This is indeed a remarkable rate of saving , given the

very low level of income, it

,.,.,s possible only under a centralized

totalitarian syste m of government, which could depress consumption
expenditure to the subsistence level.
Between 1950 and 1959 the rate of investment, as a proportion
of total output, increased rapidly.

Between 1950 and 1952, the rate of

forced investment more than doubled.

Over the first five year plan ,

it nearly tripl ed , from 6. 4 billion yuan in 1952 to 18 . 2 in 1957.

It

was at its highest in 1956 ,during the fir st year of the Great Leap, it
jumpted from 18 . 2 yuan to 33 . 0 million yuan- an unprecedented rise
of nearly 15 billion yuan within a year .
During the first plan, investment was emphasized.
the rate of investment had reached nearly 16 percent.

By 1957,

This was still

lower th an that of the Soviet Union, which was 18-19 percent in 192 8,
before her first plan. 2

1
Dick Wilson , "Counting the Heads," Far Eastern Economic
Review, LI (Ja nuary 6 , 1966) 22.
2
Abram Bergson, The Real National Income of Soviet Russia
(Cambridge: Harvar d University Press , 1961) p. 88.

Sir.cr~
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Chinese Communist planners' impatience is reflected in their
rate of investment as a percent of their gross national product in 1958.
Japan could rot reach this stage until after the second World War. Nearly
one-fourth of their gross income was invested in the 1958-1959 period,
and eventually reached a level of investment which was too great for the
Chinese economy to absorb.

As a consequence, the Great Leap movement

fell to pieces by 1960.

Gross F'ixed Investments in the "M ode rn" l '1 dustrial Sector

The "modern" sector is rather capital-intensive , consuming
electric or mechanical power, as opposed to the labor-intensive traditional sector.

This discussion includes public utilities, modern

transport and communications, and individual handicrafts, but also
includes mi litary construction, and investment in science, culture,
education , and health. 1 Estimates of investment in modern equipment
in handicrafts is also included.
The underlying cause of the rapid industrial developme nt is
glaringly evident in the high rate of investment in heavy industry.

1w. W. Hollister, "Capital !•'ormation in Communist China",
China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March , 1964) , 42. Also China's
Gross National Product and Social Accounts, 1950-1957 (Glencoe,
Tllinois : The Free Press. 1958).
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The emphasis on the heavy industry is obvious right from the very beginning of the first plan. Investment in heavy industry doubl e d between
1950 and 1952 . It reached 45 percent of the total fixed investment in the

first year of the Great Leap and then declined a little

111

1959.

Ol the total fixed investment the "modern" sector absorbed
about half of the resources in 1950 .

The proportion rose to nearly

66 percent, or two-thirds of all investments, by 1959.
five year plan (1953- 1957)

Over the first

the average investment in heavy industry

was more than 57 percent of total fixed investment.

In the two years

of th e Great Leap it touched 65 percent.
Within the category of heavy industry, investment was designed
to expand the established heavy industrial enterprises and to build new
establis hments to produce goods that were rot produced earlier in China.
This was true especially in the field of the heavy industry and machine
tools. In the light and consumption industry goods , the emphasis
was mainly on the segments already established.

No efforts were made

toward e stablishing new product enterprises in this sphere.
These

·1ew industries" in the heavy industry sector were en-

tire ly depe ndent on Soviet technical assistance and Soviet delivery of
com lP e plants and equipment. Over the t irs t plan period, about half
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of the heavy industrial investment was in Soviet-assisted projects . 1
About one-fourth to one - third of the investment in heavy
industries wont to the i3 .all-8eale Pmjects during the period of
195 - l D59

2

Gros s Fixed Investment in the Traditional Se ctor

Chinese planners made little effort toward agricultural developme nt in the hope that with little inve s tment in this area the output
could be easily raised.

There was also fear that a high rate of mechan-

ization on farms would displace th e vast labor for·ce.
centrated on irrigation projects.

Thus , they con-

Agricultural operations were le ft

to be developed by traditional methods.
The dec line of total investment in the traditional sector has
been due to the decline in non-agricultural investment in tradem housing, communal services, a nd government construction. 2 Th ere was

1 First Five Year Plan For Deve lopment of the National
Economy of the People's Republic of China in 1953-1957 , (Peking:
Foreign Language Press , 1959) , p. 98 .
2

Hollister, op. cit., p. 43.

31bid . ' p. 44.
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A substant1al declme in the agricultural sector from 1950 to 1953. Since
a co mmence ment on the first five year plan , down to 1959 , there was
more or less a constant rate of investment (one-fourth) as a proportion
of the gross national product.
ln absolute terms , the rate of agricultural investme nt more
than doubled be tween 1952 and 1956 , reaching approximately 4. 7 billion
yuan in 1956 . By 1959 it had reached 10 billion yuan.

1

Investment and Depression

In 1960 the annual plan announced the state investment was
planned to be 20 percent higher than the very high levels of 1959.
sectors were expected to get the same allocation of investment.

2

Other
These

figures were pro bably revised w1th the realization of agricultural failure of 1959 . At the same time Soviet aid had dried up by the summer
of 1960 .
There "as a considerable overinvestment in agriculture and
the Small-Scal e heavy industries during the Great Leap period.

Their

ate of investrn nt declined from 26.6 in 1959 to 10-13 percent in 1961

1
2

rbid .• p . 45.

Ibid., p 49 .

Table 8 .

Gross fixed investment by sectors, 1950-19 59

Total gross fixed
inve stment
Billion yuan
Percent of GNP
Modern investment
Billion y uan
Percent of total
fixed investment
Heavy industr~
Otber sectors
Tra ditional investment
Billion y uan
P ercent of total
fixed invgstment
Agriculture c
Otber sectors

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

2.4
5. 5

4.0
6.4

6.4
9.1

10.5
12. 4

12.5
13.9

13 . 0
13.8

19. 1
17.9

18.2
15.9

33.0
23.9

38.5
25.7

1. 18

2.15

3.61

11. 34

11. 12

21. 24

25.31

59.3
33 .9
25 .4

61. 1
36.9
24.2

64.3
45. 1
19 .2

65.7
44.3
21.4

11. 79

13.2 1

35.7
26.4
9.3

34.3
26.6
7. 7

48.8
11. 6
37.2

1. 24
51.2
45 . 2
6.0

54.45
12.6
41. 8

1. 80
45.6
38.7
6.9

56.5
23.4
33.1

2.78
43 . 5
34.6
8.9

5.70
54.5
24.5
30.0

4. 76
45.5
26.2
19. 3

6.94
55.4
27.6
27.8

5. 59
44.6
26.6
18 . 0

7. 48
57.5
31.9
25.6

5 . 52
42 .5
28.3
14.2

7.77
40.7
24 . 4
16.3

7. 07
38 .9
25.2
13.7

a

Light industry, public utilities; military construction; investment in science, culture; education; and health;
bmode rn transportation and communications.
cAgr icultural investmeilts ,iriclude investments ·in rural housing and services.
.
Government cons truction, trade, and non- agricultural investment in housing and communial services.
Source: William W. Hollister , " Capital Formation in Communist China," The China Quarterly, No. 17
(January- March, 1964) , pp, 40, 42, 45, 51.
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(agriculture) and 11 percent to 9 percent in 1961 in heavy Small Scale
industries. As a consequence of the Sino-Soviet dispute , Soviet aid
and technicians were withdrawn.

Because of the agricultural crisis

of 1959-1960 and the necessity of increasing imports of food , investment in heavy industry declined .

This led to a cut in the production

of heavy industries producing inputs for the heavy industrial sector.
Again, as a result of a fall in heavy industrial goods the investment
in transport and communications also declined.
Leap ended in a depression by 1961.

Thus, the Great

There was a 46-54 percent

decline in total fixed investment, as compared with that of 1959.

1

This was due in part to the over-investment during the Great Leap
period and the lack of absorptive capacity in the economy.

Caoital-Outout Ratio

The ratio of gross investment to the increase in gross pro duct has been 2. 2 over the 1950-1957 period, 2 . 5 over the first
plan period , 1. 4 in the pre-first-plan period, and 1. 7 in the post-first
plan period. 2 This reveals that Chinese productive efficiency was greater

1Ibid .. p. 51.
2 Malenbaum , op. cit. , p. 298.
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during the pre-plan period. One of the reasons for the decrease in
efficiency was that heavy industries have a longer gestation period
before they actually run efficiently at their capacity.
built plants began to run at their capacity later.

The Russian-

The ratios for the

post-Great Leap period are not available, but certainly the efficiency
must have declined in that period also.
Nevertheless, Chinese capital-output ratios depict a much
greater degree of efficiency than what is generally found in most
developing economies. In that sense there has resulted a kind of
savings for the economy.

Methods Used

From the beginning the Chinese Communists tried to gain
complete control over the economy . Since Communist philosophy
requires bringing a drastic cut in consumption and rise in investment,
the whole economy must be tightly controlled .
The "Three Anti" a nd "Five Anti" movements of 1951-1952
gave leaders complete powers to allocate raw materials and finances.
Private voluntary savings almost vanished.

Funds were obtained

by the regime through the following means (given in order of their
probably quantative importance in 1952): commercial and industrial
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taxes (mostly in kind) compulsory purchases of government bonds , confiscation, and new note issues. 1
The regime also was in a firm control of all large-s cale
trading activities and was thus in a position to fix prices arbitrarily.
Prices of manufactured goods were raised, while in the agricultural
sector the government occupied a monopsonistic position and so undervalued prices.

Prices of modern manufacturing products in 1952 were

roughly four times as high as in 1933, handicraft prices 2. 3 times, and
agricultural prices only 1. 8 times. 2 Thus, the terms of trade went
against the peasants.
To create additional savings and capture the gains arising from
the r ising productivity and distributive efficie ncy, wages were kept below
the productivity of labor. 3
Since the governme nt used agricultural products as raw materials
in state enterprises, it profited by buying the raw materials at a low price
and selling finished goods at much higher prices .

1 Ta-Ching Liu , "Structural Changes in the Economy of the Chinese
Mainland . 1933 to 1952-57," American Economic Review Papers and Preceedings, XLIX (May, 1959) 88.
2

Ibid.

3Ronald Hsia, "Economic Changes in Communist China", Political
~Ij,Eg,!y , XXXV (July-September , 1964) , 300.
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T he collectivi zation of agriculture and th e socialization of
industry were essential to facilitate the for ced sav ings program.
T h people's co mmune s were formed to make e ffective use of the existing surplus labor and to m a ke labor available in greater quantiti es .

1

Thus the burden of capital for mation was pretty heavy on the peasants,
through direct taxation of government pur chases of " surplus" agricultural products a t low fixed prices and by the high prices of the manufactured goods that he had to pay for.
These were the prime me thods used by the Chinese in bringing
about such a high rate of investment over the first plan period.

Birth of the Great Leap Forward

The Chinese Communists neglected agricu ltural modernization
during the first plan, but at the sa me time they failed to imple me nt any
positive population control methods.

Thus, at the e nd of the first plan

they were m danger of be ing caught in the " low-leve l equilibrium trap.

112

2
Richard R. Nelson , " A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium
Trap ," Amer ican Economi c Revie w, XLVI (December, 1956), 894 .
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A lhe same time they sensed that dependence on Soviet economic aid

was risky . The rate of capital formation was low and there was a widespread disguised employment. 1 The shortage of iron and steel was retarding industrial developme nt.
The problem faced by the Chinese planners was , following the
interpretation of Professor R. S. Eckaus' " Theory of Factor P oportions
in Underdeveloped Areas ," that of an ina dequa te capital-intensive and
fixed co-efficient sector.

The economy could rot absorb a ny more labor

unless more capital was poured in. According to this theory, e mploy ment
opportunities were inhibited be cause there was a scarcity of capital.

The

"relative ly plentiful labor is the n pushed into the cariable-co-effi cient
sector and absorbed there as long as ma r gi na l value productivity of labor
is higher than the wages it r eceives. " 2 Thus, in what probably led to the
birth of the G reat Leap F orward there was furth e r extension of the technological dua lism.

1
Hollister, ~ . p. 4 8.
2R. S. Eckaus, "Factor P roportions in Underdeveloped Areas ,"
Ame rican Economic R eview, XLV (Septe mber , 1955 ) , 559-560 .
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Nurksg Model
Professor R agnar Nurkse's theory of capital formation is that 1
in the over populated countries , the marginal product of labor in agnculture is zero; a considerable
amount of rural surplus labor can therefore be
removed without reducing total agricultural output and
can be put to use in construction of productive capital
goods, such as roads and irrigation works. Since agricultural output is rot reduced by the removal of surplus
labor, there will be more food for those remaining
on the land, and a food surplus can then be used to feed
those engaged in productive construction work. "Disguised unemployment" therefore provides "concealed
savings" which can be used to build productive capital
goods in a "costless" way, and this without any fundamental
improvements in agricultural techniques. 2
According to Professor Hla Myint , "disguised unemployment" did
not yield zero productivity, but the labor force was "under-employed. "
Thus, removing this under-employed labor meant longer hours of work
for the ones that remained on the farms . 3 This is exactly what happened
in China during 1958-1959 period. Private plots were abolished in the
agricultural cooperatives and so were the free markets.

The time that

1

R agnar Nurkse , Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953),
pp. 32-49.
2
Hia, Myint , The Economics of the Developing Countries
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965) p. 86 .
3Ibid., pp. 87-90 .
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the peasants devoted to these plots was drastically encroached upon under
the pressure from the G reat Leap Forward, and the time for sleeping
and family subsidiary occupations was reduced .

1

This continued more

vigorously after the establishment of the communes.
Following Professor Nurkse's model of capital formation, the
Chinese tried to capture all the increase in marginal product at almost
zero marginal cost.

They created employment for the "under-e mployed "

labor by expanding small-scale industries in iron and steel, fertilizer
production, power generation , traditional textile and food processing
industries, coal digging , and so on . By employing them on laborintensive projects, such as irrigation , and intensive methods of a.gricultural production.

These industries used simple equipment, manu-

fa.ctured locally, and utilized local raw material.

The production of

goods were to satisfy rural needs for manufactured and agricultural
requirements.
During the Great Leap , repair shops and spare-part manufacturing were closed down , and this labor was shifted to build dams ,
irrigation works, and so on.

The lack of the repair facilities hampered

1Dwight H. Perkins, "Centralization and Decentralization in
Mainland China's Agriculture , 1949-1962 " , The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, LXXVIII (May , 1964). 229 .
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industrial production.

Th re was a sho r tag o f la bor i n heavy and small-

scale industries for raw material , for the la bor was extensively shifted
to the indigenous projects .
As a re sult of the abrupt declin m investment in 1960- 1961 ,
there occurred a widespread exodus of worker s who had been drawn into
non-agricultural occupations , back to agriculture.

The Great Leap re-

sulted into a huge social a nd eco nomic dislocatio n.
It \lias rot until 1963 that the economy ha d r e turned to a norma l

state of affairs . Chinese planners ca m

to realize that it was not a

series of Great Leaps that they needed to overtake Britain's level of
output in a short period of lime, but consistent and we ll-coordinated
plans .
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CHAP TER V

CENTRALLY PUNNED GROWTH

Ideology and Planning

In applying his theory of histori cal dialectical materialis m , Karl
Marx analyzes the process of economic growth as a social process of material
transformation. 1 Propounding his theory of thes1s , anti-thesis , a nd synthesis,
he forecasts the inevita ble struggle between the bourgeousie a nd th proletariat
ultimate ly res ulting in a new state led by a few " enlightene d" wor kers, in which
a ll means of production are socialized.
According to Marxist-Leninist theory , as interpreted by Professor
P eter Schra n ,
Socialization of production removes a ll class barriers .
a nd so, increases productive potential of the society .
This tmplies not only the soci a l• zation of the means of
production , but that of peoples' minds also . It is the
duty of the Party to lead the peopl on the " road towa rds
socialism", wh1ch would make a ll me mbers of the
society sufficiently "red and spe ialist. " Thus , the lac k

1
E t' JC Roll , A History of E conomic Thought (New York: PrenticeHall , Inc. , 1942), pp . 280-282.
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of or over-fulfillme nt o f plan has a di rect relation to the
degree of rel ?' ·.<> "dflctrina tion dfo1· s 1
rh.JJl•»e Cammer <;(Shan· tried
tng mod rr"

(p

r

_, produ ctivity through us-

" m. Lt tne J v, use o f intensiv •• hbor , indoctri nation of peopl e,
-ul structun•d a nd tnstituhon.Jl changes in the economic sy-

st m.

Duvmg he First Plan. th y could b1 ng a bout an incredible amount

of "productive ftxed capital. " However , it se:e ms , that the Planners were not
quit a war o f the state of mmd of the people

2

Whenever there was an

overfulfi l ment o f a plan . the r e followed an 1 mme diate social reform: for
mstance , tn i952- 1953 (followed by socJahzatJOn of wdustries and collectivi za twn of ngnculture), 1955- 1956 (communes in the agricultural sector),
and 1958 (d
wer

c~ ntrali zation

a nd thP Grea t. Leap).

acco m pamed by good ha 1 ves ts .

These years , of course.

The degree of indoctrination also

followe d he pace w1UJ 1\h dJ lhL l.:o nomt c d ve lopment took place.

Chinese P la ns

Th plans m Chtna not only determ i n the allocation of resources
but a l so the distribution of products , thus I a ding the economy towa rds

1 P ete r Schran , ''Economic Pla nning tn Communist China", Asian
Surve y , II (Dece mber , 1962), 30- 36 .
2 l btd . ' p. 41.
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socialis m . The plans de tbrmine on the pre se nt consumption , present
i n estm

n~ .

and future poss1ble incre me nts in both. They also determine

the qua litie s and qua ntiti s of th

("commodity mix" ) goods to be produced.

Upon th e deci s ion on consumption and investment ratio depends the
income of the people and the financial plans of the country.

The Soviet

as we ll as the Chinese economi c planning e mphasi ze two "laws:" (l) development of the soci alist economy that would gene rate a constant growth ;
ned and ba lanced growth .

(".~ )

plan-

Tha t i s the r a te of consumption should be allowed

to r i se with th r ise of the na tiona l income afte r the process of industriali zation ha s reached a certain s tage .

This stage i s not a well defined one.

Po -I - Po , Chairman of the State Economic Commission of China,
stated tha t , dur mg 1953- 1.95 6 , the ac cumul ation-income ratio moved from
15.7 per ce nt in 1952 , 18. 3 in 1953, 21.6 pe rce nt in 1954, 20.5 in 1955,

and 22 . 8 pe rcent in 1956.

From these figure s , he set normal budget receipts

to na tiona l meo rne ratio a t about 30 pe r cent , whille that ratio of capital construction to total budge t expe nditure was set at 40 percent. 1 The income investme nt r a tio rose dur ing the first plan. As the socialization of the
econom advanced , it furth e r rose during the Gre at Leap period.

1Yua n Li Wu . The Economy of Communist China, p. 5 1.
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Accordmg to Mar x proftt is a surplus va lue a nd connotes the degrt>e of e ploitat ion thus Ll should be rul d out as a criterion for resource
allocauon . Rece nt ly th1s sta nd ha s been modified. Again , the prices of
produ c~ rs

gonds are arbit r a ril y kept high a nd thos of consumers' goods

ar kq• t<10 low. The Chin se planners do not want to lower the prices of
produ cu ' s goods becaus that would pr " nt the m from obtaining larger
profits to ena bl large- s cale inv stment.

On the other hand , they are

afraid of r ais mg the pnc s of th<.; consumers ' goods for it is likely to
r e int odu c e tht capitahsti

trading Ie me n! into their society.

Thus planning auth o r i ti s a rE' left with only two controls on res out cP alloca l!o n: d1.r ct contro l over la bor and raw mater ia l a llocation,
and mo1wta r y contro l.

Und r the latter , all purchases and sales have

to be matchEd agamst authon z d payments and recmpts, with the help of the
facto r s '>h '< h control productwn. 1
Th•· blgmnmg of nation-wide pl a nning took place in 1951 , when the
State Counell s f inancJal a nd Economtc

ommission a nnounced control

f1g111 es for production and ca pital mvestment tn industry and transport and
dn w up a plan for state-owned industnal co ne .rns.

Th e State P lanning

Comm lttl•t \\c I<' s e t up accordmg to the got·ernment annou nceme nt by the

1

)'uan- Li Wu . Tht Economy of Co mmunist China , p. 66.
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e nd of 1952 , so that th

First Fiv

e a r Plan for development of the

na tional econo my could beg 111 w 1953 . However , the final draft was
not completed untH February , 1955, and was not made public until
Jul y of tha t year .

1

Thi s d c la r a tion was w 11-timed, for the Korean

War had ro m to an nd and the Sovi ts had made their first commitment
to aid Chin s economic development in early 1953.
The State Planni ng Committee was renamed the State Planning
CommiSSion
we r

tn 1954 ,

sq , · ·, ''

and in 1956, long t rm a nd short-term planning

T il E Gtn ll Pl a nning Commission prepared the five

y a r pl ans . a nd ih State Economic Commission looked after year-toyear planning . 2 Both of the m were placed under the State Council.
Th pre cise method of planning in China is unknown, but it
is be lieved that it is a. planning by material balances , probably based
on te chnkri l co fficie nts . 3

1 choh-Ming Li , ~conomic Deve lopme nt of Communist China:
An Appra1sa.l of the First Five egs of Industrialization (Berke ley:
LJnh· rs!ty of California Pre ss , 1959) , p. 5 .

2Audrey Donnithorne , "China ' s Economic Planning and Industry" ,
China Quarterly (London) , No. 17 (January -March, 1964) , 112 .
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Du r ing the First Pl a n, th ere was a shortage of raw materials ,
a nd s o a General Bureau of Supply of R aw Ma te r ials was s et up.

For

the techm ca l dEvelopm nt a nd coordmat ion of plans , the State Te chnological

CommissiOn "'~~ <'stah ll s lw cl 1n 19 56 1
Tlw Ch mese C o111;' 1u n1 sts ende a vore d to bring about a "Socialist
inclust r 1a h Lat1on" through s uch pla ns in the futur e.
ILa tlon meant

"T~1e

To them , industrial-

mars ha llmg of a ll efforts and resources for the

deve lopme nt of heavy mdustry, a s to lay down a foundation for an industrialized s tate a nd a modermzed nati onal de fe nse. " 2 Improvement of consumer's
we lfa r e was le ft to take pla ce a s a natural conseque nce of thi s indu s triali zation.
The pla nners expe cted t'o convcrc the econo my into a socialistic
one , by the e nd of three fivtJ year pla ns. In the meantime about 50 percent of
the goods needed would be pr oduced at home by the end of the first plan
and 70 percent by the e nd of the second pla n.
Industry , according to the Chine se planne rs , was composed of
" mod r n" fac tort s , handi craft fa ctorie s , and individual handicrafts not
e ngaged in agriculture .

Th

"mode rn" component was the one that re-

ce ive d the highest priority a nd its output was to increase from 27 percent

1

Ibid .

2

Li Fu - Ch 'un , " Th e First Five Year Plan" , quoted by ChohMingLi , op. cit. , p. 7.
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Tall! 9.

Planned targeis and actu a l <>u tputs

Umt

FF\P
target
19 57

Official
o utput
957

SFYP
target
Sept.
1956

190-2 10

Official oureut
1958
1959

He a '0:._!!}Q us tr_y
Coal
rud~

011

MT

113. 0

130.00

MT

2. 1

1. 46

15.90

19. 34

270.00

347.80

5-6

2.26

3.68

40-43

27.53

41.50

E lectr ic pow r

bil . kw-hr.

Steel

MT

4. 12

5.35

10.5-12.0

8.00

8. 63

Ch. f r till zers

TT

0. 58

0.63

3.0-3.2

0.81

1. 30

Metallu r equJ )J .

TT

.00

P ow r gene ratmg
e quipme nt

M-kw

(1 .

16

0.20

1.4-1. 5

0. 80

2.15

MT

6.00

6. 86

12. 5- 14.5

9.30

12 .27

m . bales

5.00

4. 65

6.10

8.20

bil . m t r·s

5. 58

5.05

7. 25-8. 00

5 . 70

7. 50

MT

1. J 0

0.86

2.4-2 .5

0. 90

1. 13

MT

. 66

0. 91

1.5-1.6

1. 22

1. 70

Food grains

MT

181.60

185 .00

250 . 00

250.00

270.00

Soybeans

MT

11 . 22

10. 05

12 . 50

10.50

11. 50

ement

30-4-

2 05.00

Light Industry
Cotton ya rn
o tto n d o tll
Sugar

a

Mac hin -mad
pape r

8-9

Cr ops

a lnclude d both factory produ ced and indigenous s ugar .
TT = thousand tons ; MT = m1 l h on tons; bil. = billion
Sourc : Choh- Ming Li , "China' s Industrial Development, 1958-1963" China
Quarte r! , No. 17(January-March, 1964), p. 7.
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of the total gross value product of indu stry and agriculture in 1952 to 36 percent
in 1957 . Factory proclur.tion , meaning output of both handicraft and "modern"
factorie s , is expected to double in value (at constan t prices) at the end
of each plan.

The output of heavy industry would rise from 40 percent of the

total value of factory production in 1952 to 45 perce nt in 1957, with a cor responding decline of light i ndustry.

1

Mechanization of agriculture was to be undertaken over the next
twenty-five years.

The gross value of agricultural products was expected

to rise about 23 percent in the first five years a nd 35 percent in the subsequent five years.
As seen from th e Table 1, the high rate of investment that took
place during the First Pl an (discussed in chapter on Capital Formation);
brought about fulfillment and, in the case of the heavy industries , almost
overful fillment of the planned targets .

The only exception among the

heavy indu str ies was the production of the c rude oil. In the light industrial s<w lu r, machi ne made paper was the only industry that overfulfill e<l the ta>:<get.

A II th<> >:es t fE> Il short of thPir targets.

According

to the offir.ia l figures , the t r gets were me t in the case of food grains,

while soybean ta rgets were not realized in the Firs t Plan.

1choi1-\'ling Li. Fcnnomi.c Developmrn• of Communi st China ,
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After 1954 fue central government treid to control fue whole
of fue nation's economy, but found it impossible to cope wifu the task.
Local authorities often failed to comply with fue instructions of the center
and cracks appeared in the central planning.

This ultimately led to fue

decision to decentralize in 1957-1958, but it was counter-balanced by the
control of the Party, which insured carrying out fue wishes of the center.1
Thus, the power to regulate and balance production and allocate labor and raw
materials was transferred to the local authorities.
The central government departments were to collect all draft
plans that were sent by local authorities and allocate materials accordingly to the local authorities. It was the State Economic Commission
that was to unify , balance, and make a blueprint of fue plans on a national
scale . 2 A number of conferences of interested parties were called on the
process of formulation of the plans.

Th is new system of decentralized

planning did not come into operation until 1959.
Five "A

Over the period of

Jl oc', Plnns

T !1~8-1962

there was no such thing as a second

Five Year Plan; there were instead, five annual ad hoc plans. It started off

1

Audrey Donnitlwrne , p. 113- 114.

2 .

Ib1d .. p . 115.

a bumper crop and incrcdilJ e gains in UJC industrial production in

Wi.O

195!!, and ended into a food shortage, industrial dis location , a nd social

an · ceonomic confusion.

J'he Second Five Year Plan was drafted in 1956 ,

when the Chinese economy was making tremendous progress in the
industrial

bl' <'LOr,

with the aid of the Soviet technicians ; a nd the blessings

of the good 1mather brought sufficient crops.

This plan proposed to raise

China to 70 perce nt s elf-sufficiency in heavy industry and precision
machines by 962 , and to transofrm her into an advanced industriali.zed
nation by 1967.
Th~

1

amount of uasic investment dun ng the Second Five years was to

double , compared with that uf the First Plan.
sector

\va~

The s hare of industrial

expected to rise from 58 . 2 percent to 60 percent.

Th.; fig res given in Table 1 , arc the proposed targets declared
o ffic:~:

in

.. w 1356 for the Seco nd Plan Period.

T hey were again revised

cemLe.- 1957. Whatever few revised fi gures are available indicate

that

cx~cpt

oca '

£;::coal, stee l, a nd che mical fertili zers, the figures were

uv~~·n.

1 Choh - Mlng Li. "China's IndustL·ial Development , 1958- 1963,"

p.

r,
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This lowering down of the figures for petroleum was explained
as a realization of the limitations of natural resources . Again, it was
by the end of 1957, that the planners realized the importance of agricultural development; and so, they proposed r a ising the targets for chemical
fertiliz er a nd rf\ 1' m unJ.Jlements . The investment in agriculture, as
such, was not raised. Heavy industry, again, was given emphasis.
The ad hoc plan for 1959 , was appvoved by the State Council
in April 1959 , but was revised in August. 1959, since the output figures
of 1958 on which this plan was based we r e gross ly exaggerated.
During the Great Leap fever, politicians were in command everywhere a nd the carefully drawn-out targe ts of 1956 were ignored . Statistics
were reported by the cadres in the field according to the ir "e nthusiasm in
socialist revolution" rather than on the basis of fact. 1
By the end of 1959, the quotas set for 1962 (planned September 1956)
had been a lready fulfilled in 13 of 24 items.

This called for a " Supplementary

Plan for the Las t Three Years of The Second Five Year Plan," which is supposed
to have been submitted to the People's Congress in March 1960, but has not
been published .
Wh ll duri ng he Great Leap too much e mphasis was put on attaining the targets . A 1though the

~~ .;;. o .

targe ts ·~

r

fulfilled during these years,
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The Peoples' Daily complained lhallhe full variety of goods planned was
not realized. 1 Quality , variety , and cost were ignored.
A number of specialized bodies were set up in 1958, to inspect the

quality of goods, and to regulate quarterly the progress of th e plans in
agriculture . industry , capital construction, and distribution of raw m ate rials.
These organs were e mpo wered to reduce prices, suspend delivery, a nd
even stop production . But whe n "politics took co mmand," during the Great
Leap , econo mic aspec ts of the planning were set aside and the aim of overfulfilling the targets took precedence.
In 1960, when the harvest turned out to be much worse, the movement back to agriculture took momentum. In 196 1 the agricultural output
declined fu r ther.

China was forced to import (wheat, flour , a nd barley) a

total of 5.6 m1lhon tons in 1961, 4 . 7 millioHtons in 1962, and about 5.5
m illi on tons

111

1963 . 2 Th1s was , i11dccd, a big drai n on China's economy .

She had to postpone the imports of her· much needed industrial goods .

Thi s

led to a defimle s hift w the priorities, from 1 cavy industry to agriculture,
in 1962.
T he Chinese plans were too a mbittous from th e begi nning . There
were an overemphasis on industrial production.

1
Audre y
2

onnit' :urnc, p. 120.

Choh-l\lh~g

r,

~.

p. H'.

Laek of accuracy in availa ble
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statistical data made it impo ss ible to formulate the plans precisely.

Dur-

ing the first plan , the administrative organs failed to supervise the working of this system owing to its vastness, but as a result of decentralization
of 1957-1958 , the little control the planners had was lost. As a consequence,
planning became impossible after the Great Leap.

There have been no plans

published since 1960 .
Lack of co-orclination between the planning and the statistical
departments is evident from the planned increase in e mployment of nonagricultural wage-earners by 840,000 pe rsons , while the actual increase
was 2. 3 million.

This may be compared with estimates of 25 million employed

non-agricultural workers and 143 million employed agricultural workers .
The resultant increase of wage bill by 2 . 7 billion yuan exceeded the planned
1. 78 billion increase. 1

There has been overemphas is on fulfilling the targets at the cost
of quality of goods.

Industrial priority overlooked the principle of com-

parative cost. Often wages were not paid in terms of yuans and so , the
opportunity cost was not a pparent.
There see ms to be a number of illegal practices-unauthorized
purchase-orders and invoices, purchase and sale of raw materials on the

1

Yuan- Li Wu , Economv of Communist China . p . 69 .
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black market , and producti on in "underground factories. , l A campaign
was started against these ''deviations" in 1963.
These trends in the Chinese economy indicate that, although the
planners have been able to r a i se inves tment rates to a new height and the

. ,,c has success fully been increased, the r esource allocation
has not been made efficiently. It has resulted in a greater economic waste
than would have been the case under an eco nomy open to international
trade and price mechanism.
At a conference on Employment and Economic Deve lopment, held
a t Geneva ,
The socialist economists frankly admitted seriou s
pla.nning errors, for instance, in allocation of
investments between sectors, in institutional
arrange ments of co llcctivisatio n , in the choices
of techniques in large -scale industries a nd so on .
They did confess that planning should not altogethe r neglect the laws of supply and demand, also
tha t the concept of stages of development with consequences a s to appropr iate choices of techniques
etc .. should 0e applied. While the sole depende nce
of market system for planning was not satisfactory
to the western economists either . This is where
University of Ca lifo rnia's Professor Leibenstein
a nd Dr. Svenjar of Prague agreed. But, of course,
the handling of mixed sys tem is also not easy. 2

1Ibid., p. 71.
2Moha mma<l Snd i

·w0rk Vet(;l•S Gl o" i h , ., Far Eastern Economic
Q({

·~

ll.
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CHAPTER VI

CHINA IN THE INTERN/\ rl ' lN 1\L ECONOMY

It is an accepted fact tha t through international trade both trading

partners find economic be nefit.

Through interna tional trade , a nation can raise

the s tandard of living within a re latively short time .

1

China is trying to make

the use of fo re ign trade for her economic needs, but the Communist methods
0f ro::owing econom ic growth by mean s of artifically closed e vonomy does not

a llow hP.r to reap all the benefits of the inte rnational trade.
Communist Theor y of F ot•t·tgn Trade

Marx, Engels, and Lenin discusse d poli tical aspects of trade , but
did not contribute to the economi c aspe cts of international trade . In the
Soviet bloc, the e mphais is laid on the planning a nd operational problems
of foreign trade , as to what goods to impor t or export and what prices to
chaqre .
The Communist th rory of i nternati ona l economic relations is
quite different from tha t of the Ope n and f' r<'" Countries of the world .

1s eymour E . Harris, Interna tw ns. • .,,.Li ~nterregional E conomics
(New York: M cGraw-1~m Bonk Conll''""V Tno ·. 1 '1~ 7 . . 288.
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lr~rl "

Foreign

is a monopoly' f •11

domestic and foreign markets.
prices .

1

"" t.c, whit'h acts as a buffer between domest

Foreign prices have little effect on domestic

Owing to peculiar price-setting procedures, domestic prices do not

reflect domestic costs of production (average or marginal). Due to the nature
of banking system, exchange rates have little influence on domestic production . 2
A further complication was created by Marxist pricing theory

and the separation of "use value" (a measure of utility) and " production
(labor) valuc" (cost of production). "Use value" was considered the
determining factor of foreign trade.

The "URe-values"-production and

consumption goods -had to be imported to satisfy the demands or the
needs of planned development . "Production va lue" must be considered
in foreign trade, for profitable trade.
This resulted in a further development of (a)
two types of profitabilities, (i) normal
profitability of tradem arising out of savings
in cost of production through trade , and (ii)
"total use" of trade, which considers not
only production costs but also of demand factors
("usc value")- (b) Profitability of exports is
approached from the cost side ("production
value" side) , while that of imports from the
"use-value" side. 111is asynometry has further
created some diffi<'<Jlt problems. 3

1

Frederic L. Pryor, "Foreign Trarle Titeory in the Communist
Bloc", The Soviet Studies, XIV (July, 1962), 42.

3Ibid. , p. 44 .
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Domestic price s are rlistorted by the inclusion of turnover
taxes, excise taxes , anrl ><o on, which are adder! at every production
step.

Thus, it cannot be compared with world prices.

This makes

the applica tinn of the principle of opportunity cost impossible.
The Bloc foreign trade economists take it for granted that

foreign demand elasticities are infinite for a ll their exports and
supply e lasticities are infinite for their imports .
· nputs - utput technique ha s seldom been

1

discu~:>scd

The use of the
in rela lwn to

p rofitabili y coPfficients.
A very heavy emphais laid on the labor theory of value i s a

further impediment created in pricing intra- block goods , for the
factors of production are immobile . 2 Thus, intra-bloc price-systems
have be e n unsatisfactory.
I~

these conceptual diffi culties Rnd differing me thods of cal-

cu lation i n C'>mmunist countries further impeder! e conomi c growth
thro gh int<>rnational

'Ibid . , p .
2

Ibid .,

tr~ d e.

8.

Ci5 .

100

Ch 1nese l'radc P o l i e ics
Chinese trade practice s r e flect prE-cisely the same bloc theory of
i nt er na.tiono l trade . In 1952 the former Ministry of Trade was split into two:
he Min' <t'

,f International Comm<'rce a nd the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

ThP go·:cr nmr n• could val ida te or' ,IJwcl

1111\

l!uh vHiual export or import

transation and determine the price at whJeh 3ny purchase or sale was
made .

c.,

tcad<> has always been an integral and an important component
The- , ,por ts of the country a re determined by the need to

impor t. International price comparisons, wherever possible, are often
over looked i the interest of political motives.

Again, exchange rates

are not determined by the interplay of demand and supply on the free market.
Inte nal price , do not r e fl ct the cost of production, and so the comparative
cost pnncipt<> becomes r e dundant . Since self-sufficiency and a high rate
of ecOJ.omic u·:>elopme nt are the goals, the imports must , in the usual
.our"e

~f

i n;c , be

c.:.~;r;

In 195G, the Com munist
iesi' tha n

'1

e d of capital goods and industrial raw materials .

b ~ "c.

p rovided a fiftlt of China's imports and imported

thir d of China' s e xports . By 1952 Ute bloc took about three-fourth

of al China 's exports a nd provided her "ith two-thirds of her imports. 1

1Pauline

win. '<_he Foreign Tr·a dP 'Jf C~mmun.ist China: Its Im-

.l!.!~S~ OP ~ -~'Jr .. • l~ ~·~t· .

'- 1rir ·

/1

,

;..)rat-~..;1- .

1

g64} P ~ 31.
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A Coordinating Committee (CONCOM) had been set up in Paris In 1949,

on a voluntary basis, to control the strategic exports to the East European
Soviet Bloc.

The pendulum of Chinese foreign trade suddenly moved to-

wards the Soviet Bloc, as soon as the United Nations recommended in 1956
an embargo against Red China.

The CONCOM was then entrusted with

the duties of regulating Chinese trade . 1
In 1951, China decided to expand her trade with the bloc and the
non-aligned countries, and continue trading with the CONCOM nations
as far as the embargo permitted. 2 Her trade with the bloc increased
tremendously until the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 that resulted in an open
denunciation of each other.

The pendulum, once more, took a swing

toward the western countries.

Sov iet Aiel
As mentioned before, Russia was the biggest ally of China, and

the .:hl':. t t':· c Year l'l1n of China was mo re than successful because of
the

assi~tance

rende r('<! by Russia.

1 coNCOM Countries are; ·n1e United States, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Gre ece, Italy, Japan , Luxembourg, the Netherlands , Norway,
PorLgz., Turk<y , th< Jnitcd Kingdom, t'ram:e and West Germany.
;!

Op. (a. t. , p. 32.

102

Sino-Soviet economic relations can be divided into two phases:
The Era of Co-operation, that lasted for ten years, from 1949 to 1959, and the
Era of Conflict, that began sometime in the e nd of 1959 and the beginning
of 1960 , and still persists .

The impact of these two politically-oriented

phases have a very far - reaching impact on their economic relations .
Communist China is the only underdeveloped country in the
world that has received an insignificant amount of financial assistance
from external sources. Although the aid was very limited in terms of
quantity, it was very timely and very effective.

Soviet Russia was

,;1::; vuly '' traternal" country that had lent a helping hand to China prior
to 1960.
f'

If :wu loans '"Cl"C g ranted

to China. The first being the Sino-

Soviet Agreement of Frebruary 14, 1950, providing for a loan of $300
million-$60 million per year from January 1950 to the end of 1954, at
an interest rate of 1 percent per annum.

1

The amount was to be spent

on imports of industrial goods from the U. S. S. R.

China agreed to

repay the sum by 1964. 2 Under the first loan agreement, China was to
implement. with Soviet assistance, 141 industrial projects during 1950-1959.

1
Ibid.
2E. F . Szezepanik , " Foreign Tra de of Mainland China , " Conte l'Oorary China . fiT (19?fl i. P. 70
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Some 50 to 70 percent of the m am equipme nt was to be supplied by the
Soviet Union. 1
The second loan was a nnounced on October 12 , 1954 , and provided
for a. long-te•· m credi t of 52 0 m illion rubles, or $ 130 million . 2 China was
to under tak" 15 a dditional e nterprises, wllh supplies of equipment a mounting to $100 million. 3
According to Prof ssor Choh-Ming Li , the financing of the socalled Sov•ct-ai d projects i.Jy Russia has been only 30 . 5 percent of the total
cos t 4

'he total cos t of the

oviet-aid proJects came to 5 , 140 million

yua n . Of this total , 4 , 060 million went into building 50 of the 141 projects
agreed upo n , a nd 880 mi llion went into the 15 e nterprises agreed on in 1954.
The remaining 200 mi llion were spe nt on the two projects out of 55 arranged
in 1956. 5 Accordi ng to Choh-Ming Li , out of Ute total aid of 3, 120 million
yuan only 1, 570 million were utili zed in fin anci ng the Sovie t-aid projects,
whi ch

a m ount~d

to 30 percent of the project cost of 5, 140 million . On the

l;bid .• p . 84.
2 Feng-Hwa Mah , p . 35.
3 Far Eastern Economic Review,

·n

(May 12 , 1955 ) 603.

4 c hoh -Ming Li , Economic Develop ment of Communist China: An
Appra1sal o f the First Five Years of Industualization (Be rke ley: University
r Colifo•·nia Press, 1959), p 174.
5

Ibid .
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Table 10.

Estimate of annual Sovi e t-loans to Communist China by uses,
1953-1957a
Econ. loan
as percent
of state
capital
investment

Economic loans
Yuan u. s. $

Milita ry loa ns
Yuan
U. S. $

1953

140. 7

60

297.8

127

438

187

2. 2.

1954

140.7

60

743.4

317

884

377

1.9

1955

304 . B

130

1,353

5 77

1,657

707

3.7

1956

117. 4

50

0

0

117

50

0.8

1957

23. 3

10

0

0

23

10

0.2

726.9

310

1,021

3, 120

1 , 331

1.5

Total

2,394.2

Total loans
Yuan
u.s. $

a Official exchange rate: U. S. $ = 2. 345 Yuan . Unit: 1 Million.
Source: Feng-Hwa Mah , "The Financing of Public Investment in
Communist China, " The Journal of Asian Studies, XXI(November,
1961), p . 36 .
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other hand , Feng-Hwa Mah conte nds that only 726.9 million yuan were
extended in the economic aid , while 2, 394.2 million yuan were given in
military aid over the same period of the First Plan. 1
The Soviet economic aid had contributed only l. 5 percent of the
state capital investment from 1953 to 19 57.

The total Soviet economic

aid of 727 mi 11 ion yuan amou nted to only 0. 53 percent of the total budget
revenue of this period.

2

According to Professor Choh-Ming Li, the aid

contributed (1. 57) billion yuan) 3 percent of the total state investment
(49. 3 billion yuan) , over the First Plan. 3

Besides these economic loans , Russian technical assistance and
her trade have been of enormous aid to Chinese economic development. It
is reported that,
More than 10 , 000 Soviet specialists were sent
to the People ' s Republic of China for varying terms
be t ween 1950 and 1960 . Some 10,000 Chinese engineers,
tech nicians and skilled workers, and about 1000 scientists
were taught and trained in the U.S.S. R. between 1951
and 1962. More than 11,000 stude nts and post-graduate
students graduated from Soviet higher educational
establishments in this period. 4

1

F e ng- Hwa Mah , p . 36 .

2
Ibid .
3 choh- Ming Li , "Economic Develop me nt, 11 The China Quarterly,
No. 1 (J·anuary - March , 1960), 38.
4 naniel Wolfs ton, "E cononncs of the Split, 11 Far Eastern Economic
Review , XXXIDI (May 28, 1964) 422.
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Other Communist countries ha ve sent more than 1 , 500 experts to
China. 1
Dunng the period 1954-1959, the U. S.S.R. had provided such te
technical mformation, as, 1, 169 sets of technical data on industrial construction; 3, 704 sets of blueprints of machinery and equipment; and 1, 018
items of other information on industrial and mining aspects, all without
payments . 2 It was this technical information that enabled China to fulfill her First Five Year Plan . Soviet sources have declared that ,
Of Ch ina's total output in 1960 , the enterprises
built with Soviet technical aid accounts for 51 percent of the rolled stocks , about 85 percent of trucks
and tractors, 40 percent of the e lectrical power,
55 percent of the st a m and hydrolic turbines, 19
percent of the aluminium, 70 percent of the tin,
100 percent of the synthetic rub her , etc. 3
Li Fu-Ch'un , the Planning Chief of China, also
stated that, the Soviet selected "The latest technical
achieve ments" a nd gave China "first class and most
adva nced equipme nt. tt4

1Feng-Hwa Mah , op. cit., p. 37 .
2
Ibid.
3 " Soviet Economic and Technical Aid to China: Facts and Figures",
Soviet Docu me nts , IT (October 12, 1964), 18.
4 alvin Suey Keu Chin , A Study of Chinese Dependence Upon Soviet
L:nwn For Economic De v l opment· As A Factor In Communist China's Foreign
Policy (HongKong: 'lnion Res <~.r h Tnstiiutt> , 1959) , p. 73.

Table 11.

Sino-Soviet trade, 1950-1961
Million rubbles

a

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962b

Soviet
exports

350

431

499

628

684

674

660

490

571

859

735

331

210

Soviet
imports

172

298

373

428

521

579

688

664

793

990

763

496

464

Balance

178

133

126

200

163

94

-2 8

-174

-223

-131

-28

-166

-254

aValues for all years are shown in " ne w" foreign trade rubles, introduced January 1, 1961. Conversion at the
bofficial exchange rate, $1.00 equals 0. 90 rubles, will provide reasonable approximations of dollar val ues.
Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXXill (September 19, 1963), p . 723.
Minus sign denotes Soviet import surplus. Minor discrepancies between balance shown and difference of items
are due to rounding.
Source: 1950-1954 : Voneshniaia Torgovlia, No. 10(1959), p. 288 ; 1955-1959: Voneshniaia Torgolvia USSR za
1955-1959 gody (Moscow , 1961); 1960-1961: Voneshniaia Torgovlia USSR za gody (Moscow, 1962).
Oleg Hoeffeding, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations-1959-1962," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science. CCCIL (September 1963), p. 103.
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These figures illustrate the enor mous extent to which the
So iet L' nion played its par t in Chinese e conomic development in the
years of !hell' coopera ti n. Although tho amount of capital loaned by Russia
was small , tlw tm·cstme nt mcJcl o wns vc l' y effective . Nevertheless, the
above figt n

c~

.. , fl e et the state of underdeve lop me nt that China was in,

prior to the l1 r s t Plan.
The Era of Confli ct

The Chinese economic calamities coi ncided with the SinoSoviet rift . Moreover, her industrialization d·r ive received a severe
blo w, as she could not obtain s ufficient long-term loans from the
Communist Bloc tlor from the West . In s ummer of 1960 , 1, 300 highly-skilled
Soviet spe ialists were recalled. 1 This gave the Chinese econo my a paralytic
stroke.
By .J uly 1960 , at the ti me of the withdrawal , at least 137 of the
291

projec t~

togeth•·~ wi tr

rpmained unco mple ted . The departure of the Soviet experts,
blueprints. and the drastic reduction in the supply of complete

sets of e uipme nt and key engi neering items, put not only these uncompleted
project ~

out Pi operation . but other related pr ojects as well. According to

Po-I -Po , 300 pro'ects covering a wid!' ra nge of industries and spreading

1 "Pc king- Mos C'ow: Ma jor Pronoun e mc nt!' , " China News Analvsis ,
No . 479 (Augu st 2, 1963), p. 5
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throughout the country came to an abrupt halt as a result of the Soviet
withdrawal. 1

Sino-Sovicc i'nt 'c

Prior to 1959 Communist Chinese trade showed a very high degree
of dependence upon the Soviet Russia . But the period following 1959 is
characteri zed by independence from the U. S. S. R. and diversification of
trade relations among the non-Bloc countries .
Because of the lack of availability of data from the Chinese official
sources, one must have recourse to secondary data which may hot be accurate
but may throw a light in that direction.

Again, during this period the fre-

quent fluctuations in the exchange rates have made it difficult to arrive at
the actual change m Chine se trade , in terms of other currencies.
Since the extension of the first Soviet loan of $300 million in 1950,
China signed trade agreements each year . She demanded industrial equipment , wtercommunicahon instruments, mining instruments, chemical
plants and cereals.

For r eturn, she exported silk textiles, tea , wool,

non-ferrous metals , vegetable oils. cotton textile s, and rice.

i Hontlld ·t;. si a, ·Economic Chang<1S

; "1

Communist China".

T hf' J>OHl;2~'!~I'l~£!L XX • . U u ~' -&> " <<'n•''"'.

;;it>'± , .

1•9 .

llO
Table 12 . Sino-Russian 196 0-19€2 tradea
1962

1960

1961

336. 5
11 7. 0
90.9
33. 4
157.6

71. 0
26 . 3
108.6
16.6
15.8
92.3

8.0
16.6
72.5
15.0
18.7
79.3

735.4

330.6

210. 1

55 . 1
55. 5
38 . 8
49 .7
125.6
172.8

43 . 5
38.5
1.1
0.3
113.7
157. 7
141. 5

31. 8
29.3

Chinese I m ports
Complete plant
Othe r m aclnn l' ry and equi p me nt
Petrole um products
Stee l produ <t>Ce r ealsb
Others
Total
Chine s e E x)22r ts
Metals ores, cone.
Metals and alloys
Oil s eeds , e tc.
Rice
Tesc hles
Clothing
Othe rs
To tal

~ o 5 . tl

763 .3

18.4
106 . 5
163.0
115. 7
464.7

:l<ew rubJts in million . 1 N. R. equal s U. S. $ l. 1
R ye, \\ lotH ! a nd fiour , cotton , wool , silk-excluding clothing.
Source: Fo.r Eas tern Economic Re view,XXXXIII(September 19, 1963) ,
p. 723.
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Under the protocols si gned in February and December 1955 ,
the U.S.S.R. promise d to de liver machine tools , building machinery,
road-building equipment and other things.

China, in exchange, agreed

to export Jute , wool , silk and vegetable oils .
Aceording to Chinese official sources , 10 of the Soviet-aided
industrial prlj e cts had been completed by 1954. 1 These included a
heavy steel-rolling mill , a seamless steel-tubi ng mill, the sheet-steel
mill of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company, and the Haicho w open cut
mine at Fushin. In Fe bruary 1955, the Soviet "gift machinery"
to the Friendship State Farm in Hailwong Kiang was reported to
consist of 98 tractors, 100 harvestors, 128 tractor ploughs, and 120
tractor drawn grain planters . 2
The decrease in China's for eign trade in 1956 and 1957, could
be explained in terms of political turmoil that took place in the Soviet
B loc that yt:a r .

The Hungarian revolt and the Polish crisis, together

with Russia' s repre ssive action in these countries, had an adverse
effect on th e Bloc ' s trade. Russian loans were a lso reduced during this
period, causing Sino-Sovi('.t t rade to decline further. 3 China's trade

1E. F . Szczepanik , "Foreign Trade of Mainland China," Contempora n Clu na , 1958- 1959 . In (19&v,

z_@ ~..:
JRoberi F . Dernberge r (ed. C. F. Remer), Three Essays on
International Economics of Communist China (Ann Arbor: University of
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with th e Free World leaped upwa rds.

Another reason for the drop in

China's tota l trade in 1956- 1957 was that it was deliberately p lanned
to be r.:duC"cd by 8. 4 perce nt , for the Chinese Planners thought that
Ineroascd fo1 <'Jgn trade increased the burden of payme nt on the economy.
Thr·n arrived the per iod of China's a mbitious Great Leap Forward. and Sino-Soviet trade boomed once again .

TheSoviet Union dur-

ing this period wholehr•;ll t<'dly s upported Ch1 nese aims a nd laid before
them <'xperu:Hv• technica l . ma terial , and huma n resources.
Accord111g to Chinese reports. during the first months of 1958
the So viet Union supp lied China with complete sets of up-to-date equipment for more th a n 20 large motnllurgi oa l , machine building , power,
a nd coal e ntt>rpr1ses.

In nddition l.o this , the U.S .S.R. increased her

eJo.1JOrts o f industrial goods a nd e quipment in 1958 by four-fold over that
of 1957.

SI11• c1lso suppli e d 8, 000 trucks , 2 , 000 trailers , more than half

a million tons of petroleum , locomotives , and ra ils . 2 In return China
supplwd sovbeans. r1ce edible oils and fa ts , minerals , meat , poultry ,
eggs, tea , fr ui ts , hemp . tobacco, a nd li ght indu s trial products.

This

indi cates a gradual c hangl• o n th P si de of Chinese exports fr om consisting e ntire ly of raw agricultural items to commercial cash crops, meat,
a nd light industria l goods .

1 IbJd.

p

2Jbid.

p. 111 .

134 .
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The Sino-Soviet agre me nt on the further exte nsion of economic
co-orwranon was Signed in Moscow on February 7, 1959. Under the
agreem nl the coun!rtes und rtook to cooperatively construct 78 large
pla nts m th< following mdustries : m etallurgy, building materials ,
che m ica l coal , oli , m achine building , radi o equipment and power
generators . To tal value of these activities was estimated at $1.250
billion . 1
In the· years ol the Great Leap (1958 and 1959) China's imports
from Ru ssia rose by 75 perc nt. and her exports by 49 percent.

Both

expor ts a· w 11 as imports reached their highest watermark in 1959.
The Sino - Soviet trade accountce for approximate ly half of China's
total tr ade . The trade expansio n was the direct result of the urgent
de ma nd s for capita l equipe mnts a nd ra w ma terials , generated by the
Great Lea p . The "completed

~e t. s

of equipme nt" reached a peak in

1959 , account1ng for 42 perce nt of total exports to China . 2

Had It not been for Soviet Russi a's cooperation, China could
never have been a ble to imple ment a "Leap" in the face of foreign

1
2

Szczepanik
Olr~?:

~ ·,

p. 111.

Hoeffend1ng , " Sino- Sovie t Economic Relations 1959Americ a n Acad my of Political and Social
1963) , 94 - 106 .

1962'. Tht Annals of th
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exchange shortages, the United States' e mbargo , and the Western
reluctance to trade with Chma.
Chtnese exports in 1959 showed an increase in dairy products and
rice, but the most conspicuous increase was in textiles and clothing.

The

latte r m ay have a direct re lation tofue suspension of shipments of cotton
to the West.

1

The protocol signed in February 1959, covering the period
1959-1967 , was to assure China of Soviet Russia's forthcoming assistance
in her futur e economic deve lopment and implied the "progressive integration of the Chi nese e conomy into that of the Communi st Bloc .

2

It is a matter of speculation when one tries to gauge the mo"tives
o( Russ1 a u1 refusing to extend auy cred its to China dur ing the per iod of

vigorous tr·ad . On the co ntrary, she demanded repayments by raising
Chinese exports . It might be th a t they had already paid out la rge sums
in loans to the Chinese (the latest agreement signed in 1959 was for 5 . 0
biillon t' ubl es), and they may have felt worried about repayment. 3

1
A. Boon , "Tbe Foreign Trade of Chi na," The China Quarterly,
No. 11 (July-Septe mber , 1962) , 181.
2
Jea n Polaris , "The Sino-So vie t Dispute" , Internationa l Affairs,
XXX(Octobe r , 1964) , 649 .
3
209 .

•· Hard Bargaming" The Economist , CCIX (Apri l 15, 196 1) ,
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In any event , China, the only and the largest underdeveloped
country in the world , was thus rendered without any kind of external
economic assistance from a ny source.

At the same time, from 1958 on,

Mongolia , North Vietnam, and North Korea was treated to a bounty of
Soviet economic development assistance , which , when compared on
a per capita basis, far exceeded anything that China had received from
Russians .

1

Nevertheless, Sino-Soviet cooperation has benefited the
Chinese to an e normous extent. Accoeding to Mr. M. A. Shushlov's
report in the April 3, 1964 issue of J>ravda , Sovie t Union had built
more than 200 large industrial e nterprises, shops, and other projects
equipped with modern machinery.

The Soviet-assisted factories enabled

China to produce annually 8, 700,000 tons of iron, 8,4 00 , 000 tons of
steel, and 32 , 300 , 000 tons of coal and shale , 70 percent of China's
tin outpu t , 100 pe rcent of its synthetic rubber output , 25 to 30 percent
of its electric output, and 80 percent of the carriers and tractors
produced annually.

The Soviet-aided defense plants were the core of

Chinese defe nse industry. 2

1

Hoffending,

QP.,_

cit. , p . 104 .

2Wolfstone , op . cit. , p. 421.
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The Era of Sino-Soviet Conflict

Sino-Soviet economic and political relations took a dramatic
turn in recent years .
, it is clear that

According to the figures given in Table

the Sino-Soviet trade reached its zenith in 1959 . Afterwards, it consistently declines, both in exports and in imports.
a huge debt in her trade dealings with Russia.

China had incurred

Since then, she has been

making a deliberate effort to create a surplus in her Soviet trade accounts.
The decline in Russian trade has further reduced China's ability torepay the deficit .

The withdrawal of the Soviet technical specialists

coincided with Chinese agricultural disasters.

Lack of sufficient

loans from the bloc as well as from the West s lowed down her industrialization drive.
At least 137 of the 29 1 Soviet-aided projects remained uncompleted at the time of the withdrawal of the Soviet aid in July 1960.
As a result, Chinese total trade receded to about the 1958 level and
there was a lso a reversi on to tho 1958 orientation.

The bloc trade

declined by 15 percent and was balanced, a nd the trade with the nonCommunist world rose by 10 percent, which enabled China to earn a
surplus in transferable curre ncy. 1

1A. Boon, "The Foreign Trade in China," The China Quarterly,
No. 11 (July-September, 1962) , 181.
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In 1961, it was dec lared that China could not execute the agreed
volume. As a result , there was a deficit of approximately $320 million
(288 million new rubles) . In 1962, owing to continued bad agricultural
yields ,

Chin~

had to buy cereals from other countries and curtail her

exports of toods tuffs . As a result her total trade also declined . In
the same yeat>. 1961 , Marshal Chen, referring to Sino-Soviet relations
in Geneva , stated, "China is too big to be anybody's satellite. n1
In 1960 , China' s imports from the U. S.S. R. still accounted for
50 percent of her total imports, but in 1961 a nd 1962 the proportion fell
to 30 percent a nd 25 percent , respectively . 2 This was a direct consequence of the Soviet decis ion to drop her aid to China.

Over and above

the commerical debt, however , the Soviet government also exacted
repayment of the Korean War loan. 3 Thi s added to the strain that the
Cl il'eRe economy was already undergoing because of the economic disaste rs tha t preceeded this period.
lie can observe from the Table

trat in l.(J6 L-1!162

:~~per;.!'

, on the Sino- Soviet trade,

fro m China dwindled by about 500 million

new rubtes. while expor s fe ll about 300 million.

In a communique

J " Pe!ung Du ck Egg," The Eco'1omist, CC (July 8, 1961)

120.

2 Polaris, op. Clt. , p. 647 .
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on the trade talks held in 1963 in Moscow, it was stated that the
Chinese would he used to pay off part of the debt payable in 1965. 1
Since the Chinese are badly in need of foreign exchange to buy industrial
equipment from the West , it has been typical of the Chinese to build
up a trade surplus with their trading partners. It is quite evident from
the trade figures given in items

(Table

) , that China has built

up this surplus by slashing down the imports of capital goods from
the U.S.S. R.

Thus , she turns to the West for her industrial goods.

Sino-Soviet trade fell by 37 percent in 1962 over that of 1961,
while in absolute terms, Russian exports totalled 210 million new rubles
compared to 496 , respectively. 2 Total industrial equipment imports
fell to 25 million rubles from its 1961 level of 97 million.

Oil, an

important import, had fallen by 25 percent , probably because China
had found a frie nd in Albania- a new oil-country.
While her exports rose to one-fifth , from her earlier position
of being one-seventh in 1960 , China's food products had found their
way to Russia in much smaller quantities in 1962; for she herself
had to import grains from abroad.

China had a lso cut down her imports

1coli na MacDougall , "Russian Trade Down" Far Eastern
.Economic R eview, XXXXI (September 26 , 1963) , 802 - 803 .
2
TI?_!d
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of petroleum and steel.

The imports of complete plants also declined

more or less into insignificance . At the same time, China has been
buying wheat from other countries and selling rice which is more
expensive , thus gaining the benefit of the trade.
have also lound markets abroad.

Her textile products

Nevertheless, it appears that the

Suviet U ion did not deliberate ly cut her exports to China since the quarrel,
but she had undoubtedly adopted a purely commercial policy toward
China -

"cash on the barrelhead . " It was China who cut down on

imports in order to pay for her debts and to spread out her trade
relations, while not keeping all the eggs in the same basket.
Th e Soviet Union supplied no grains to China, while exporting 6. 8 million tons of grains in 1960 and 7. 5 mi llion in 1961
to other countries. At the s a me time China had to purchase grains
worth $300 million of hard-earned foreign exchange from the West.
"While acknowledging China's food difficulties , 500,000 tons of
Cuba sugar due to Russia was to be delivered to China in 1961,
as an ' interest free loan' repayable in 1964-1967. "

1

The U.S.S.R.

a ls o sold 300, 000 tons of wheat , rye, and flour to China and expoT:z::!.

mdl w n tons to oth er countries .

China decided to buy six

million tor.. of cer als from non-bloc countries.
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According to the Sino-Sovi e t trade agree ment, concluded in
Peking o n April 20, 1962, "Russia is to take Chinese ores and send
back rolled metals , oil a nd chemicals, lorries and machinery."
In 1962, Ru Rsian e xports to China totalle d 210 million new rubles,
compare d with 330 in 1961 and 735 in 1960 . It was a fall of 37 percent
trade in 196 1. Nevertheless, Chine se exports have fallen only from
496 million in 1961 to 464 million in 1962, despite Chinese agricultural disasters.

This indicates as to the frantic zeal with which

Chinese are wanting to repay their obligations to the "fraternal
country " prier •o the date agreed upon and then follow her own paths.

121

CHAPTER VI

TRADE WITH "FRATERNAL COUNTRIES"

As seen from the Table

, on China's trade with other

Communist countries, the statistics are often not available , except
for that of Poland . Until 1956, trade was conducted on the basis of
annual trade.

But in 1956 East Germany and Czechos lovakia entered

into a long t erm (1957-1962) agreement to supply plants and equipment
for Chinese Second Five Year Plan. In 1958 and 1959 all the rest of
the East European countries signed agreements up to 1962, except
Rumania . 1
Soviet Russia wanted to integrate the Chinese economy into
the Socialist bloc ' s planned development programs, by making her a
member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) .
This woula enable th.e R ussians to coordinate each other's plans, and
yield tl .e advantages of the division of labor within the Socialist camp.
But the Chinese would not accept Soviet supremacy in the COMECON ,
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Table 13.

China's trade with East-European Co mmunist countries,
1953-1957a
1953

BULGARIA
Exports
Imports

1954

18.2
21. 2

1955

17.1
18.2

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
E xpo rts
Imports

1956

1957

20. 6
20.6

256 .6
258.9

267.8
320. 6

376.6
389.6

343.6
379.7

354.2
423.0

116. 1
146 . 1

111.6
123 . 8

110.7
119.0

EAST GERMANY
Exports
Imports

212. 1
241. 5

HUNGARY
Exports
Imports

134. 3
118.2

POLAND
Expor ts
Imports

109 . 0
124 . 0

118 . 0
148.0

141. 0
139 . 0

141.0
201. 0

149.0
179 . 0

EAST EUROPEtN
Total trade

360

4 25

455

467

490

- 25

-40

Balance ot trade b

269.5
398.0

Total

1 ,556.0
1, 83 1. 8

658.0
791. 0

2,200

: Rubl es in miihon
in U. S. $million
N te : The tab does not include Albania, R umania, a nd Yugo s l a vi a. Thus ,
in total for 1957 can be esti ma ted at abou t U . S. $ 500 million .
Source : ContemQora r y Chi na, III ( 1960), p. 89. Da ta base d on Vnes hni a
torgovl ia, Moscow, October 1958 .
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and so r efused to join it . Nevertheless, it is quite interesting to note
that China's trade relations within the Communist Bloc have been
having a direct bearing on her relations with Russia.

During the

period of Sino-Soviet cooperation (1949 -1959) China's trade with
satelli te countries reached its climax. No sooner had the SinoSoviet quarrel reached its heights at the Bucharest Communist
Conference than there resulted the tearing up of Sino-Soviet trade
contracts and withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China.

There

followed a deterioration in China's economic relations with the
East European satellite countries.
Of course, the European Communist countries had not shovm
much enthusiasm in trading

"~th

China, since her exports consisted

of low quality raw materials . With the exception of Albania, they have
all been pro-Russian in their economic and political approach to their
prob lems.

Chi na found Albania as her only ally in the Balkans . Un-

fortunate ly for her , Albania is the most underdeveloped agricultural
country of the bloc, and s o her economy is not quite complementary
to that of China to establish compatible trading relations.

On the

contrary , China has to pour aid into Albania which strains her economy. Jn return China gets Albania's political support.
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Survey of Bloc Trade

Albania . Sin_o-Aibanian trade did not develop before 1956 . It
was in the same year that very important oil wells were discovered
whi ch gave a hope to Albania's oil indus try, to quadruple production by
1960.

1

While Russia herself produced a huge bulk of oil and the

satellite countries e ntirely depended on Russia, her prospects of exporting oil to th bloc were remote.
buyer

China was the only prospective

They exchanged oil , copper, chro me ores for steel, rubber,

industrial raw materials and textiles from China. 2 Albania expected
to export around 2 million metric tons of oil annually. 3 111ltS , China
was fairly successful in replaci ng Russia as her source of oil.
ln 1959, Sino-A lbanian trade amounted to 2 . 7 percent of
Albania's total foreign trade, while Russo-Albanian trade was 5 0
pe rcent of 1l.

4

While i n 1961 , Sino-Albanian trade was 28 . 2 percent.

By 1962 . the year touching the he ight of Sino-Soviet schism and the

lnanie l Tretiak , "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente , "
The China Quarterly , No . 10 (April-J'une, 1962) , 131.
2 szczepanik , "Foreign Trade of Mainland China", Comtemporary
China , 1958- 1959, III (1960). 112.

3n aniel Tre tiak , "China' s Eu ropean Ally" , Far Eastern
Economic Review, XXX (May 16 , 1963), 370.
4

Lewin, op. cit. , p. 51.
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first year of Ru s sian open economic boycott against the Adriatic renegade, China took 59. 1 perce nt of the Alba nian total.

1

In 1961, China

extend ed a loan of $123 million to Albania and promised to establish
two textil e factories. 2
Bulgaria. Sino-Bulgarian trade opened in 1952, and by 1958
Bulgarian exports reached 41 million rubles (calculated tourist exchange rate of 28 rubles to a pound). 3 Besides agricultural machines
and small e lectr ic motors , which form one-third of all Bulgarian
exports to China , she also exports non- ferrous metals, chemicals,
fertili zers , plants and power stations , dr illing equipment , behicles
and so on , fo r Chinese tin, tire s, leather , jute , and such . 4
East Germany.

China and East Germany have one thing in

common that stand out quite distinctly by the oth er na tions of the world.

struggle for recognition

East Germany is the most im-

portant trade partner of China, nex t only is the Soviet Russia , and
closely followed by Czechoslovakia.

l

East Ge rmany supplied China

Tt·e tiak, " China's European Ally" , p. 37 1.

2 szczpanik , op . cit. , p . 112.
3 Liliana Brisby , "Bulgaria: Leaping Forward Without Communes",
Th e China QLtarterly, No . 3 (July -September, 1963) , 82.
4 s zczepanik , op. cil. , p. 114.
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Table 14 .

China's trade with Soviet bloc , 1958-1963 (U. S. $million)
1958

BULGARIA
Imports from
Exports to
CZECHOSLOV
Imports to
Exports to

1959

11.3
7.2

6.3
10.0

109 .2
91. 0

99 . 6
95.5

EAST GERMANY
Imports
Exports

1960

1961

1962

1963

12
26

9
29

89
90

50
36

20
29

HUNGARY
Imports to
Exports to

57.6
33.5

39.6
44.3

POLAND
Imports to
Exports to

72.2
36.3

42.9
56. 1

50
46

27
21

15
23

19
25

RUMANIA
Imports
Exports

25.9
16 . 6

29 .4
29.9

33
26

9
20

2
11

14
10

Note: Roughly converted at the following rate , Polish Zloty 100 = rubbes
22. 5; E. Ge r m a: Mark 100 = rubbes 40. 50; Rumanian lei 100 = rubbes
15; Ruble 1 = U. S. $1. l.
Sourc
1 58 -1959 figu res, Colina MacDougall, "China: East E urope an
Trade," Far Eastern Econo mi c Revi e w, LI(Janu ary 27, 1966) ,
P• 123.
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with complete sets of equipment for 32 power stations, two cement
plants , and set of turbines in 195 8-1959.

The value of East German

exports being almost doubled that of all the other Soviet satellites put
together . China has incurring deficits on her East German trade until
1962. 1 About 90 percent of Chinese imports from East Germany consisted of capital goods , while China exported rice, vegetable oil, and
raw materials .
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia exported
rail way equipment, machines , metallurgical products, trucks, chemicals ,
cables, power stations, radio transmitters , machine tools, tractors,
and diesel engines, while China exported food stuffs and tea, oi l seeds,
non-ferrous metals , leather, tobacco, soybe ans, and other agric ultural products .
During the period 1953 -1957 there was a marked increase in
dealings with the Communist countries.

The increase was reported

to be from 72 percent in 1953, a nd to 80 percent in 1954-1956, in terms
of value of goods . 2 In terms of volume of goods, it had already reached
the 80 per cent level by 1952. 3 Chinese press reports stated that China's

1

Martin J. Esslin , " East Ger:na ny: Peking- Pankow Axis?" ,
The Chino. Quarterly , No. 3 (July-Septe mb~r. 1960) , 86 .
2.Far Eastern E conomi c Revie~, XXi (December 13 , 1956) , 752.
3Ibid. , p. 109.
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trade wi th the Communist countries in 1958 was expected to increase
by 10 percent above the 1957 level , which would make this trade
about $2 , 000 million, as compared with $1,820 million of the 1957
level of trade . 1
China's East European trade figures were not made available
until 1960 , but in 1961 some figures have been declared by the partner
countries .
The total trade of China with the Communist countries i.n 1960
was $2 ,2 38 million and this dropped to $1,184 million in 1961.

Trade

with the non-Communist nations was worth $1,437 in 1960 , which receded
to $1,381 million in 1961. 2 This shows that Ch ina's trade with the
Communist counh·ies has fallen more drastically than with the Free
World.
Among the East European countries, her trade with Czechoslovakia fell by 67 percent and her exports to that country by 55 percent. Her imports from Poland fell by 26 pe rcent and exports by 55
percent. 3

1

Ibid.' p . 109.

2 colina MacDouga ll , "China: East Euvopean Trade," Far
Eastern Economic Review, XXXIX (March 14, 1963), 542.
3 Ibid .
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From the accompanying statistics on the Sino-East European
trade, one can observe tha t the trade between these countries flourished
until the turn of the decade of 1950's. By the last few months of 1959,
there was a sign of decline, which culminated into a big drop in 1960.
Thi s fall in trade with the European "fraternal! countries is
directly related to her conflict with the U. S.S.R. , the withdrawal of
Soviet aid, and Chinese efforts to build up an export surplus in order
to accelerate the repayment of the previous Soviet aid . These
factors were accompanied by the internal economic crisis owing
to failure of the Great Leap . Again , Chinese goods wer e facing
an inelastic demand in these countries . The agricultural calamities
within China forced her to buy huge amounts of foodstuff from the West.
As a result , her total trade declined and her industrial advance s lowed
down.

Trade With the Non-Communist World

The importance of the trade with non-Communist countries to
th e economy of China was com paratively little before 1960 . With the
decline i.1 Sino-Bloc trade, there was a phenomenal rise in the SinoFree World trade.

Thus, in thi s dis cu ss:on Sino-Bloc trade relations

have been dealt with at length.
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Co mmunist China ' s first post-Korean contact with the Western
trading interes ts took place a t the Moscow inte rnational economic
confere nce of Apr il 1952.

F r om then onwards, Sino-Western trade

gradually rose . Chinese trade with the CONCOM countries is subject
to govern ment control and all exports must be licensed , and imports of
Chinese manufactures are subject to quota .

Western Europe and Japan

P r ior to 1960 , We stern European trade was much smaller, for
Russia was the main source of supply of the industrial goods which went
to China. Aft.er 1955, West Eur ope supplied a little over 10 percent of
imports of China, and absorbed about 8 to 9 percent of Chinese exports.
Even in the peak year of the Chinese trade (1958) West Europe supplied
only a bout one- fifth of total Ch inese imports. 1
The e mbargo was very important until 1957·. In 1959, it was
relaxe · a nd ,ere was a s harp rise in China's imports from the West.
This indicaie s that Soviet bloc 's supplies we re inadequate. Again she
had broken up trade r e lations with Japan, and had entered into the Great
Leap with the background of good harvests that year.

There was a great

de ma nd for iron and stee l , fe rtili zer , rolled copper, and nickle.

l

L2\v i1:, o r . ci t . , p ._52.
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Until 1962, China had not bought very substantial quantities
of Western machinery , though it bought consistently -

in particular,

from Britain and West Germany. Its main imports from England have
been wool , iron a nd steel, non-ferrous metals , a nd chemicals.

Im-

ports from France, have been iron and steel and fertilizers, and in
recent years, cereals . Imports from Germany have been iron and
stee l and chemicals . At the end of 1963, two fertilizer factories were
ordered -

one from Netherlands and the other from the United Kingdom.

Italy supplies a petroleum refinery, and an alcohol plant from France .

1

China's trade Minister Lu Hsu-Chang, on his visit to E urope, indicated
his interest in buying more of agricultural machinery , precision instruments, tractors, mining equipments, trucks, and air crafts . 2
Chinese exports to the industrial West have been mainly eggs,
tung oil , oil seeds , hides, tea, silk, wool, edible oils , cotton , and such
raw materials and agr icultural products.

The United Kingdo m and West

Germany have been the most important buyers (see Table
J apan is another source of industrial goods for China.

China

exchanged foodstuffs , coal, iron ore , salt and soybeans for J apanes e

1Lewin, op. ci t. , p. 57.
2v. Wolpert , "Minister Lu in London", Far Eas~.!!_~conomic
Review , XL (May 9, 196 3), 313-317.

132

synthetic fibers, machine tools, steel, and chemicals . The total
trade turnover in 1950 touched $60 million, but was reduced to $15
million in 1952, because of the embargo. 1 Then onwards SinoJapanese trade expanded but gradually.

In 1956, Chinese imports reached

its highest at U. S. $67. 3 million, while Chinese exports touched 83. 6
million . By 1958, when a Japanese worker tore off a Chinese flag,
they receded to $50. 6 million and $54. 4 million and in 1959 they reached
almost a vanishing point of $3 .6 million Chinese imports and 18. 9
million exports.

Sino-Jananese trade, with a raphoachment, again re-

vived in 1962. to $38. 5 million Chinese imports and $46 million Chinese
exports to Japan. 2 In the future Japan is expected to replace Russia
for Chinese industrial necessities.

In 1963 , medium and long term

credit arrangements for China were worked out by Japan.

Canadian and Australian Grains

China has been buying small quantities of wheat from Canada
and Australia prior to the agricultural calamities of 1959, 1960, and
1961. In these years China bought grains from Australia worth $162

1Lewin, op. cit. , p. 58.
2Dick Wilson , "Trade Across the China Sea" , Far Eastern
Economic Review , XLV (Septe mber 3, 1964) , 429.

133
Table 15.

Chinese imports, main trading partners and type of commodity,
(U.S. $ million)
1960

(Grain Exporters)
Australia
Argentina
Canada

24

Total
West Europe (Indus trial Export)
France
Belgium
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
West Germany
Total
Japan (Mainly industrial)
Industrial total
Asian and African (raw materials,
mainly rice, rubber, cotton, etc. )
Burma
Ceylon
Indonesia
Malaya and Singapore
Syria
Pakistan
Tanzania
Sweden
Uganda

9
34
53
44
40
13
8
90
~

350

1961

1962

1963

162
4
121
287

97
20
137
260

202
3
_J!1_
302

36
10
30
4
8
6
37
_B
162

43a

58 a
10
19
13
5
4
37
15
161

8
19
3
5
4
24
_B
137

3

17

38

62

353

179

175

223

7
25
35
28

37
17
36
4
12
10

28
20
0
4
2

14

14
21
34
5
20
13
10
12
11

4
9

9

5

Raw material total

123

129

64

140

GRAND TOTAL

510

595

499

665

Total including countries not
listed here

687

741

587

723

9

alncludes cereals in the following value: 1964~$29 million ; 1963 ~ $44
million ; 1962 ~ $29 million.
Source: Colina MacDougall , "China's Foreign Trade," Far Eastern
~conomic_Beview, LI(January 27, 1966), p. 122.
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million in 1961, $97 million in 1962, and $202 million in 1963 . Grain
purchases from Canada amounted to $121 million in 1961, $137 million
in 1962 , and $97 million in 1963.

France supplied cereals worth $29

million in 1962 and $44 million in 1963 . Argentina and Mexico also
sold small quantities of grains. As a result, China had to spend
(including 15 percent of freight charges) , $376 million in 1961, $332
million in 1962, and $398 million in 1963 on grain imports.

1

This

diverted a huge amount of her scarce for eign exchange away from
industrial imports.
E ven during these days of scarcity of goods in China, she has
been continuing to export rice, for rice commands a higher price than
wheat . 2 She has tried to shift local consumption of rice to wheat through
rationing.

Latin American, African, and Asian Trade

China is motivated to trade with these countries on political
grounds, because economically these countries are not complementary.
The gain through comparative advantage is rot significant enough.

The

1 colina MacDougall , "China's Foreign Trade" , Far Eastern
Economic Review, LI (January 27, 1966) , 122.
2

Lewin , op. cit. , p. 68 .
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trading partners, on the whole, are agricultural and labor intensive.
Again, these countries are also trying to industrialize themselves and
so, they need industrial equipme nt which China cannot supply for she
is herself not yet an industrial country . Her cost of production of
industrial goods is high compared with the industrially advanced nations.
As a consequence, the demand for China's goods is limited, and the
prospect for the economies of scale to operate in Chinese industrial
production are dim. As seen earlier, the quality of goods produced in
China has been too poor to compete with Wester n goods.

Moreover,

China's economy is not strong enough to enable her to extend credits
on a large-scale to enable these developing nations to buy her goods.
On the contrary , China would like to build up a surplus with all her
trading partners, which these developing countries would not welcome.
The agricultural goods that China buys from these countries are, in
most cases, available from other sources more cheaply.

Thus, the

trade with these countries is probably a design for exporting Marxism,
but these chances are rather remote. 1
Before 1956, no African state recognized Communist China,
but today fourteen states have done so.

Of these, China's big trading

~obe rt A. Scalapino , "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa".
Foreign Affairs , XXXXli (.July, 1964), 653.
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partners are the United Arab Republic, Morocco, Mali (including
Senegal and Mauritania) , Nigeria, and Ghana, in order of importance.
In general , there is a declining tendency in her trade with these countries
since 1960.

TI1ey are also feeling the heat of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

China has created a surplus with nearly every country except for small
deficits with Kenya, Syria, and Morocco. 1
China bought Egyptian cotton, textiles, and peanuts from the
UAR.

Other cotton supplying countries are Sudan, Tanganyika, and

Uganda.

In general , Chinese imports from African countries are oil

seeds , cereals , gum, skins, minerals, sugar, cotton, tobacco, coffee,
industrial diamonds, a nd Algerian oil.

Chinese exports consisted of

light machinery, steel , textile machinery, sugar refining equipment ,
tea, pig iron, chemicals, paper, and dyes.
On her trade with Latin America, China imports Brazilian cloth,
wood, and tobacco; Cuban sugar, and nickel, copper manganese, tobacco,
and hides.

China exports paper and chemicals to Brazil; to Cuba she

sends rice, rolled steel, machinery, chemicals, cotton cloth, and tinned
meat . Most of the other Latin American countries, such as Argentina,

1 Figures for 1960 and 1961 are taken from; 1963 Year Book
of the Far Eastern Economic Review (HongKing: Far Eastern Review,
1964) , p. 86.
Figure s for 1962 are taken from ; Daniel Wofstone, "Sino-African
Economics" , Far Eastern Economic Review , XXXXIII (January 13,
1964)' 349 .
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Uruguay, and Chile, want China to pay in hard currency and their
tariff wall s are too high for Chinese goods.

They would not allow

China to build up a surplus in their trade, which has discouraged
China in developing her South American trade. 1
Afro-Chinese annual trade has surpassed the $100 million
level only once (1960) in the last ten years , while in South America
it has seldom touched $10 million until she made Cuban sugar pur-

chases in 1961 and Argentinian grains in 1962. 2
With her Asian neighbors her motives behind trade are guided
by politico-economic considerations.

Burmese rice, Ceylon's rubber,

and Indonesian oil are given preferred treatments and long-term contracts.

She has expanded her trade with HongKong, Malaya, Indonesia,

and Japan, since her first plan, so as to earn convertible exchange,
cultivate politico-economic ties , and gauge the possibilities of getting
long- term credits.

China may dump he r goods on the Asian market

to compete with Japan and India in the future, so as to force her bargaining
position there. 3 She has been exporting food products to the Chinese

1 Lewin, op. cit., p. 72-74.
2Ibid., p. 72.
3Yuan- Li Wu , The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction , p. 180.
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Table 16.

Chinese exports, main trading partners and type of commodity
(U. S. $ million)

ASIA
(Light industrial prod. and food)
Burma
Ceylon
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Malaya and Singapore
Syria
Pakistan
(Mainly light industrial products)
Australia
Canada

1960

1961

25
28
208
52
57

21
27
7
9
212
180
35(10)
56
66
4
1
4
4

4

11
6

WEST EUROPE
(Mainly raw materials and agricultural products)
23
France
4
Belgium
24
Italy
21
Netherlands
6
Sweden
Switzerland
9
United Kingdom
70
West Germany
69
Total
JAPAN
(Mainly raw materials a nd agricultural products)
21
Japan
Total

1963

26
29
260
31a
94
3
6

7
3

11
4

15
5

16
3
12
15
4
9
86
40

17
5
14
14
5
10
65
...1Q
169

21
8
19
16
8
10
52

31

GRAND TOTAL
Total including countr ies not listed here 745

1962

641

_..!!
175

46
215

.-1§.
250

552

719

666

825

aJanu ary-July, estimated (numbers in brackets denote number of months
covered).
Source: Colina MacDougall , "China's Foreign Trade," Far Eastern Review,
LI(January 27, 1966) , p. 121.
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inhabitants of HongKong and Malaya, and agricultural raw materials
and light industrial goods to the rest of her co-traders.

Composition and Direction of Trade

In the pre-Communist era in 1947 , consumer goods consisted of 19 percent, capital goods 18 percent, and the other 62 percent
raw materials (such as cotton) and fuel (gasoline). 1 But soon after the
Communist takover, the composition of imports changed.

Capital goods

comprised 31 percent, consumer goods less than 9 percent, raw materials
and fuel about 61 percent. For the period 1955-1957 imports from the
Soviet consisted of machinery and e.q uipment 37 . 2 percent, and from the
Wes t 7. 6 percent; transportation equivment from Russia accounted for
2. 5 percent and from the West 1. 9 percent; crude chemicals, 1. 7 percent from the "Iron Curtain" and 24.4 percent from the "Free countries!' ;'
while Russia supplied 19. 8 percent of manufactures and the West supplied
22. 9 percent of it; and other requirements amounted to 36. 7 percent from
the Soviets and 8. 6 percent from the West. 2 There was only a very small
portion of "other" things, consisting of consumer goods .

1
Yuan-Li Wu, An Economic S~ rvey of Communist China (New
York: Bookman Company, 1956) , p. 469.
2Yuan- Li Wu , The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction, p. 174.
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China's exports have predominantly been metals, foodstuffs,
agricultural raw materials , textiles, and light industrial goods.

Dur-

ing the period 1952-1957 , for which the statistics are available, China
has made huge surpluses by making net exports of food products to the
tune of $5 . 8 billion in 1952 , $7.6 billion in 195 3 , $5.55 billion for 1954,
about $7 billion in 1955 , $7 . 5 billion in 1956 , and $6. 6 billion in 1957 . 1
Thus, she is to a very great extent dependent on agriculture for her
imports.
As regards direction of trade, the Communist bloc took 26
percent of her trade in 1950, according to Soviet statistics (Chinese
version, 33.5 percent).

By the end of the Firs t Plan it rose to 75 per-

cent (about 50 percent with the Soviet Union) . 2 This shows that the
political affiliations, rather than economic considerations, have played
a very important role in Chinese international trade relations.

But there

was a sudden change in the direction of trade by 1960. In 1960, the nonbloc trade was 42 . 2 percent of the total trade of $3,475 million in 1961
and 1962. It was 56 percent each of the total trade of $2,464 million

1

Based on figures given in Ta-Chung Liu and Kung-Chia
Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and
Economic Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press , 1965) , p. 253 .
2Ibid., p. 175 .
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and $2, 198 million , respectively. 1 In 1963, there was a trend further
away from the bloc .-

non-bloc countries absorbing 64 percent of the

tota l trade of $2,420 million . 2 TI1is i ndi cates that China's total volume
of trade had touched its bottom in 1962, after a consistent decline since
1960.

This tendency of rising non-bloc trade may be attributed to China's

buying of grains from the West in her years of bad harvests.

But the

1962 figures give a definite indication towards the future rise in China's

We stern trade.
From the above discussion one may come to the conclusion
that China could implement her First Five Year Plan only because of
Russian trade and assistance.
Forward.

The same is true of the Great Leap

Inter nally the financing of this industrialization was made

possible by cutting down the consu!p.tion to its minimum. If the same
thing is looked at from the point of view of external economic relations
it was financed by creating a trade surplus and giving high priority to
industrial equipments and restricting the consumption of imports . It
was only when she was faced with the Great Leap Forward disasters and
the agricultural calamities that she had to buy huge amounts of grains

1
Based on figures given by, Colina MacDougall, "China' s
Foreign Trade" , Far Easte rn E conomic Review, LI (January 27,
1966) , 122.

2Ibid.

r. I)Je 1'• .

F

~.;... {.

. .VQ(l

r-ou". tr tcs ' trade wi th China , 195()··1963"

______Q!nnes e 1EJ2 r ts _
y ,·ar

12. ~Uh <?.:.'!Y? •J2_
\·a ,,e

lnde:><.

- - - -- - - - - -- 1950
1&51
1952
19G3
lf·54
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1S62
1 63

4 52

446
273
28 '1
294
317
434
528
771
652
669
742
637
654

67. 5
66.6
41 .4
!2 . 9
13. 9
47.3
64.9
78.9

115.2
97.4
100. 0
110.9
95.2
97. 7

-~ ~ ucoru

Value

_
Index

Chine se expor ts
--- - Tog' free-world
-~ £Q ffi
___
Va lue
Value
Index
Index

Chine s e
"export''
surplus

--- - - -

53 5

204
210
447
336
347
294
309
316

58 . 6
60.4
128.8
96.8
100.0
84.7
89 1
91. 0

526
368
433
380
487
641
624
756
693
767
638
599
754

69.7
68.4
48.0
56.4
49. 5
63.4
83.7
81.4
98.6
90.4
100.0
83. 1
78. 1
98.4

22 5
204
226
226
264
223
215
245

85 . 3
77.4
85.6
85.5
100 . 0
84 . 5
81.6
93 . 0

+ 82.6
+ 78.5
+ 95.4
+145.3
+ 85 .5
+ 16 . 8
+20 I. 2
+ 9fi . 2
- 15. 1
+ 41. 8
+ 97.7
-104. 7
- 38. 5
+100.6

aCuban trade was included in free-world statistics, Chinese imports from Cuba were, U. s. $32. 1 in
1960, 95.6 in 1961 and 85. 3 in 1962. Chinese exports to Cuba are unknown. Index = (1960 = 100).
Value = U. S. dollars (millions)-figures are rounded .
Source: Based on tables given in, Yuan-Li Wu, The Economv of Communist China: An Introduction (New
York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1965), pp. 183-184.
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from the West, worth more than $l. 5 btllion over the pe riod of 19611964 .

Th ts reduced her total trade and s lowed down her indus trial

growth.
Po.,, quality Chi nese goods is a nothe r big factor that inhibits
her t rade. She must deve lop new products and improve the qua lity of
her good s . Unless s he expands her exports , China will have to depend
on for eign trade for her i ndus trial developme nt for a long time to come.
Once she pays up her debts to Ru ssia, and ge ts ove r he r internal
food proble m , she can expand he r trade in the futur e . But in a ny eve nt ,
China 's r apid industr ializatio n program, in the absence of a huge increase in exports, mus t depend on Western cooper a tion.
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CHA P TER VII

Ah APPRAISA L OF CHINA 'S INDUSTRIALIZATION

Nationa l Income

As the discu s sion above has reve aled , statistics of Chinese
ec no mi c deve lo ment have been highly unreliable. In any case ,
ir:

·;; ~ri

l

~ig-..lnl s

are mor relia ble than the others . The national

According to the offi cial figure s , the net material product
ine1 e ased by 5 3 per cent in 1952- 1957 (1952 = 100). By 1959, it was
150

pe ~ ce nt .

As given in Table

, Liu - Yeh ' s e stimates give us an

in ·ea se i "ne t darn stic pr oduct" betwe en 1952 a nd 1957 as 33.4
percent increase (1952 = 100) , with a 75 pe r cent i ncrease in 1959 . 1
On tt,., c •hu hand , Willi.::.m W. Holliste r shows an increase of 51 percent
o rer tl.~ 19'' 2·- 1957 period and 12 2 percent over 1952-1959.

2

1 Ta- Chung Li~.; and Kung- Chia Yeh, ''Pre li minary Es timates
o: ~~e Natk,n2: :n~ ~:;nc ~f the Chine ..... 'I··· ~1la d, 1952 -1959," American
_E conomic Review P apers a nd P r oceedings , LI (May, 1961), 4 89.

2William W. Hollister, China's Gross Na tional P roduct and
Soc 'al ccounts , 1\:':' f·- •.>lf>l (C hicago : Th :F ree P ress of Glencoe,
195d;' pp. 132 - : 33.
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Professor Wu sho ws an increase of about 33 percent between
1952 and 195 7, follo wed by another increase of 20 percent between 1957
and 1960, with a decline of 31 1erce mt om 1960-1961. 1 Thus, the
rate of

SlUlU<u

growth over the 1952-195 7 period woudl be, according

to o ffi cial hgures , 8. 9 percent, Liu - Yeh esti mate 6 percent, Hollister's
8. 6 percent, and w,,•s 5. 2 percent.
U we take the Liu-Yeh statistics on national income of China,
we obser ve that over the F irst Five Year Plan agriculture had shown
very little progre ss. During the good harvest years of 1958 and 1959
agricd re r.oweci :"airly good performance . F actory manufacturing
had shown a very impressive gain of nearly a fo ur-fold increase over
1952 -195'1 . But the predo minant s hare went to the producer's goods
industries which increased s ix-fold over the same period, while consumer's
goods was 4.uite low.

But then it was about three times higher than

producer' s goods . At the same time imports of comsumption goods
was s ubflt(.OIO:ial.

One~

the Communists took ove r , imports of con-

s•.;mpti or goods was ver.Y Insignificant. As a result, with a rise in
populati on r ise in the rat s of inve stment and taxation, and an

1 Fr orn ·ua n- Li Wu, eta!. , Tne Economic Potential of Communist
Chma (Menlo P ar k , Caiifornia: Stanfor d .R esearch Institute , 1963), pp.
24 1 a nrl 340 ; quoted in "\'uan- Li Wu , The F. co nomy of Communist China:
An Introduction (New Yo<"k: Frederick A. P raeger, 1965) , p. 88 .
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accelera ion in the expor s (especially of the agricultural products) meant
a severe squeeze on tile consumers and particularly those in the agricultural sector.
Tne snares of mining, cons truction, transporation, trade ,
and government administration were substantial.

Population Growth and Consumption

All through this study it has been observed that China's r apid
population growth has been a formidable drag on her economic growth.
Population gro wth has a very significant e ffe c · on labor- supply, per capita
consumption, per capita output, composition of output , and volume of
exports a nd imports .
Ltke all other economic s tatistics of China , population figures
are also dubious.

According to a British writer, Russell Warren Howe,

China's population may be as low as 400 million, or the same as that
of Indi a. l rne census taken by the Communist regime in 1953 showed a
total oi 1> 8:> mil ion, which at the rate of 2 percent growth, should expand
to '74 7 m1l1i n today .

11vt11er source suggests, during thos e disasterous

1Russell Wa:::-r en Howe, "Chi nese Chec kers Check Again, "
§jatis, Septe mber 3, 1965 , p. 62 1; quoted in Dick Wilson, "Counting
the Heads , " F a r Eastern E conomic Revie w, L1 (January 6, 1966), 22.
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Table 18 .

National income of the C i~~>c Mainland , 1933 and 1952-1959a
Billions of constant 1952 yuan

-.a

....
"' 0

~ .~ ~

s s'8g

~
t)
"2 ~
0 Cl) 0
u "'"tl

~

0.

1933

1952

1953

1954

1955

195 6

1957

1958

19 59

Agriculture
33 . 9
Manufacturing
fac ories
3. 9
P roducer's goods
0. 8
Consumers goods
2. 5
Hand icraft
4. 4
Mining
0. 5
Utilities
0. 1
Construction
1. 0
Modern transpor tation an communicati"ons
· 1..1
Old fashioned
trans portation
2. 6
Trade
8. 2
;overnment
a m mistra ion 1. 4
0. 4
F inan ce
Pe rsonal ,:j1-~ 1 ·v u..:es 0. 6
Res identi al rents . 2. 0
Work brigacles

34 . 2

34. 8

35.5

35.8

37.0

37 . 2

40

42

6. 5
3. 2
3. 3
4. 7
1. 5
0. 3
1. 8

8. 3
4. 4
3. 9
4. 8
1. 5
0. 4
2. 3

9.6
5.3
4. 3
5. 0
1. 8
0.4
2. 7

10.4
6.3
4. 1
5. 1
2. 3
0.5
2. 9

14.5
9.4
5. 1
5.3
2.4
0.6
5. 0

16 .0
11. 1
4. 9
5. 4
3. 1
0. 7
4. 6

19
14
5
6
4
1
6

25
19
6
6
5
1
8

2. 1

2. 6

2. 9

3. 1

3. 5

3. 8

4

5

2. 7
9.7

2. 5
10. 0

2.4
10.2

2.3
10.5

2. 5
11. 2

2.4
11 .5

3
12

3
14

3.3
1.3
0. 6
2.3
0. 6

3.7

4. 1
1.5

5
2

0.5
2.4
0.8

4.8
1. 7
0. 5
2. 5
0. 8

5. 0

0.6
2. 3
0.4

4.0
1.5
0. 5
2. 4
0.4

0.5
2.6
0. 9

6
2
1
3
3

71. 4

75 . 3

79 . 3

82 . 3

92. 1

9 5.3

108

61 . 1

70. 0

73.9

78 . 8

88 . 8

93.5

125.3 152. 4

Vallle a ded in

Net

1.3

1. 8

3

3

~ me s tic

Product

59.5

12 5

..;om. Chinese
es i mate of
National
i nco n1~

a
bSub1tem are rm,nded figures.
Offi cial exchange rate: U. S. $1 = 2, 34 :i 19 52 Yuan (The "J e nming P i" ) Note :
fo r wellknown reasons, the figures should not be c onverted into U. S. $.
Sou rce : Ta - Chung L iu and Kung-C hia Yeh, "Preliminary Es timate of the
National Income o the Chine se Mainland, 1952-1959 , " The Ame r ic a n
EconomiC R eview Papers a nd P roceedings, LI(May , 1961) , p . 490 .
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vears of 1960 to 1962 , some 50 million people died of hunger and
deficiency diseases. 1 In a ny case, various other estimates of total
population fail between 700 to 725 million figure for 1966 ; and the
estimated rate of growth falls between 2 percent to 2 1/4 percent. 2
F t·om the above table it is quite evident that the gross domestic
product has been consistently rising from 1952 down to 1960, in absolute
terms; and so has the gross domestic investment.

The ratio of gross

domestic product to gross domestic investment has also been successively rising until the last months of 1960. In 1952 it was 19 . 1 percent ; in 19G7 . 25. 8 percent; in the second year of the Great Leap
(1959) it reached 33 .8. percent.

It touched its highest watermark

in 196 0, at the 43. 7 percent leve l , and r eceded in its last months.
In 1961 it reached its bottom at 2 1. 4 ; a nd again picked up in 1962,
reaching 32. 8 percent level.
On the other hand , government consumption has been more or
less around 10 percent of the gross domestic product.
As a result a l arger bulk of the rising gross domestic product
has been diverted away from consumption as the years passed by.

1 "General Survey". Chin3o ]'<~ws Analy sis , No. 432 (August 10 ,
l:io4 1, b.
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At the same time, the population h as been growing at an average rate of
about 2. 2 percent between 1949 and 1958.

Thus, per capita personal

consumption has been sque ezed throughout the period under study.
A mi nimum subsistence level has been estimated at 16 8 yuan
per capita for the urban population and 79. 6 yuan for the rural population ,
or a mean of 92. 6 yuan for the population in general. 1 The above table
reveal s that during this period, only during the period 1956-1959 has
this subsistence level been met.

In the year 1960 and 196 1 the consump-

tion level has fallen much below the bare subsistence level.
Th 1;e asants spent 58 percent of their income on food in 1955 ,
15 percent on clothing , 22 percent on consumer goods, and 5 percent
on services, while urban workers spent 55 percent on food , 12 percent
on clothing , 13 percent on consumers goods , and 20 percent on services,
ren•. utihties, and transportation. 2 These figures represent the
characteri stics of a typically underdeveloped society that the Chinese
e Jcnc my possesses.
s a consequence the r apid economic growth in Communist
Clnna has not really benefited the consumers; r ather industrialization has
taken place at the cost of consumers.

1Yuan-Li Wu, op. cit., p. 90.
2
Ibid . . n. 91.

T able 19.

E stima te of Chiua's gr oss domesti c product, investment and consumption, 1952-1962

produc t
( 19 G2 B. Y. )a

Gros s
dom-s tic
inves tm ent
a
(l9 G~ B. Y.)

75 . 6
78.9
82.2
86.1
96.6
100.0
110 .7
119. 1
120.7
82. l
109 . 0

14.5
19. 0
20.6
22 . 1
25.3
25.8
29. 9
40 .3
52 . 8
17.6
35.8

Gr os s
dom es tic

19 52
1953
1954
19 55
19 56
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962a

Government
.consumptioll_
\ 1952 B. Y. )
7.3
9. 1
8.0
8. 4
8. 5
10.3
10.6
11. 0
13.1
11. 2
11.4

e sidual
(1 95J B. Y. {'

Mid-ye ar
population
(i n million )

53.8
50.8
53.6
55.6
62.8
63.9
70.2
6 7.8
54.8
53.3
61. 8

568 . 9
582.6
594.8
608. 2
612.2
637.2
654.0
668.0
6 82.0
693 .0
705. 0

Per capita
personal
consumption
( in yuan)
94 . 6
87.2
90. 1
91.4
101. 1
100. 3
107.3
101. 5
80.4
76.9
87 . 7

:(1952 B. Y.) = In billions of 19 52 yuan.
R evised estimates.
Sour ce: Quoted in Yuan-Li Wu, The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction (New York : Frederick
A. Praeger, 1965) , p. 91.
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According to Professor Wu, the rate of growth of the gross
national product in Communist China is 6 percent a year, if the 1952 1962 period is considered.

On a per capita basis, the annual growth rate

of gross national product would be 3. 6 percent for 1952-1960, and for
1952 -196 2 it would be 1. 5 percent. If economic development means a
rise in per capita personal consumption, the annual growth rate of . 25
pe rcent total during 1952-1960 period, and per capita consumption -2. 5
percent.

During the period of 1952- 1962 it would be 1. 4 percent. total

and - 0. 75 percent per capita. 1

Future Prospects

In a predominantly agricultural country like China, it is on
the performance of the agricu ltural sector, which feeds the rapidly
rising urban and the rural population and e nable s a 'high rate of investment
without which industrialization would be slowed down and the squeeze on
the consumers would be too hard to borne by them.

The wageries of the

weathe r is another factor that poses an obstacle in the path of a rapid
e cono mic growth .in China.

She must provide herself with better farm

equipment , increase the production of fertilizers .

They must also t ake

s pecial measures to conserve and reclaim the land, so as to increase
the acreage under cultivation .

1Yuan-Li Wu, p. 203.
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The high priority given to undustrialization was changed in favor
of "agriculture being the foundation and industry the leading factor" of
economic develop me nt , in those hard years of 1960-1962 . Most observers
of the Chinese a ffairs fe el that this shift in e mphais was temporary .
Certainly , the Chinese Communists would not be able to afford another
Great Leap disaster.

Chinese peasants do have a certain freedom re -

garding thier private plots and in marketing of produce not subject to
s tate procurement.

But it is not certain as to how long this freedom

will last , for in the interest of national defence and rapid industrialization ,

the consut ters may have to suffer even more.

China has made dis-

asterous blunders in isolating herself from the rest of the world and
espec ially from the Sovie t bloc , so that she is unable to obtain credits
from other countries, whi ch has put extra pressure on the consumers.
This was only p ossible because it is a totalitarian regime.
China's steel output of 15 kilos per capita , is only one - thirtieth
o Brit· h production and one-fifth of American. A minimum annual
supply of . 5 tons of coal e nergy per capita is essential to create conditions of an industrialized community.

China, a t present, has only 3

percen of this amount of e nergy. While the United States has eight tons
of coal e nergy per capita. 1 Thus, China has to go a long way to r ank

1w. K. , " China 's 'Third Five Year Plan", The China Quarter ly,
No. 25 (January-March, 1966) , 174 .
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among the industrial nati ons of the world . He r future economic development would depend on he r abi lity to incre ase the productivity of her
agricultur a l sector and controlling population growth . China should also
pay particular a ttention to having a coordinated and a consiste nt planning
mechanism.
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